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ABSTRACT: 
This paper will investigate several different 
realistic architectures for Real Time Computer Systems 
to determine which is a more optimum design choice 
with regard to cost and reliability, and to explore a new 
method for system reliability analysis. This new analysis 
method requires only the knowledge of the interfaces 
within a system to predict the reliability of the entire 
system. Special attention is paid to actual component 
failure modes and how they affect different architectures. 
INDEX TERMS: Fault tolerance, real time control, 
gracefull degradation, component failure modes, reliabilty 
calculation techniques, computer system architectures. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Realtime Computer Systems are probably the 
least appreciated computer systems by both the public and 
computer systems designers. However, these computer 
systems are increasingly common in factory production 
equipment such as robots, milling machines, and lathes. 
They run chemical plants and automotive test equipment. 
Recently, medical equipment and commercial aircraft have 
been introduced with real time control systems. Often 
these computer systems are called "Embedded Control 
Systems" because they are small and are hidden from view 
within a larger system. 
Real Time Computer/Control Systems endure some of 
highest legal liability exposure of any type of computer 
system. A failure of a machine tool control can injure or 
kill its operator; a malfunction of a medical life support 
system can kill a patient; a failure of a chemical plant 
controller or an aircraft stabilzation system can kill 
hundreds of people. 
The increasing cost of liability insurance is making 
the need for ultra reliable industrial control systems 
more imperative. Not only is the actual risk of an 
equipment failure important to consider in its design, but 
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its perceived risk may be more important to those that 
design, sell, use, or insure the equipment. Often, many 
real time control systems are operated by non technically 
oriented individuals in an atmosphere of worker versus 
management antagonism. If a failure results in an injury 
there may be a strong urge to sue for real and/or imagined 
. . . 1nJur1es. 
Real Time Computer Systems typically cost 
between twenty and eighty thousand dollars. The typical 
markup for a piece of industrial equipment is three times 
the cost to manufacture the item. The markup includes 
costs for development, insurance, profit and allowance for 
dealer profit margins. The cost of an embedded control 
system is often one half of the cost for the entire 
machine. For a fifty thousand dollar machine, the cost 
allocated for the control may be eight thousand dollars. 
These eight thousand dollars must include direct labor 
costs for assembly and test as well as mundain items such 
as cabinetry, wiring, fans, AC power mains disconnects, 
and power supplies. The cost of the "electronics" is 
often contrained to less than four thousand dollars on a 
fifty thousand dollar machine. 
There are many phrases that have been used to 
describe or characterize Highly Reliable Computer/Control 
systems, including Fault Tolerant, Fail Safe, Fail Soft, 
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Fault Detection, Fault Masking, Redundancy, Fault -
Confinement and Reconfiguration [l],[2]. To the user of 
the equipment, the minimum requirement would be to alert 
the user to a failure when it occurs to allow the operator 
to take corrective action. The system should be designed 
in anticipation of common types of failures to prevent the 
system from acting in a manner that would injure an 
individual while the operator is attempting to respond to 
the indicated error. A desirable feature would be to 
design the system so it continues to function in a limited 
but safe manner to aid the operator while he attempts to 
take corrective action to the indicated fault. The ideal 
system would continue to function without degradation 
until corrective action is taken. 
The ability of a real time computer system to 
continue to function without any degradation in the 
presence of a fault usually requires the cost of triple 
redundant hardware, which is too expensive to implement in 
most industrial control systems. Most of the time, the 
redundant elements would be unused, they represent lost 
opportunities for increased system performance or reduced 
capital investment by the user. 
Real Time Computer Systems (RTCS) are usually 
produced by small firms because of the limited market size 
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for such products, often only several thousand systems per 
year. These firms are of moderate size, typically f 
employing a few hundred people with annual sales of ten to 
one hundred million dollars. Small firms, because of 
their limited financial resources, have product design 
cycles of one to two years. They do not usually develop 
new technologies but apply existing technologies to their 
problem domains. 
The conventional means used by small companies to 
design reliable real time computer systems is usually an 
adhoc approach that contains a measure of guesses, hopes, 
and a little fact. These adhoc approaches develop in 
response to the cost in time and engineering talent needed 
to analyze different architectures that could be used for 
new real time computer systems. The proper method for 
evaluating new architectures for reliability is to design 
a model of the proposed architecture and then analyze the 
design, component by component~ Formal methods developed 
under government or university direction are often complex 
and vague. (1 - 3]. The analysis would take into 
consideration the type of component, its relationship to 
the rest of the system, and requirements of the system 
in a given application. This is not an easy task, and it 
can get tangled in a web of subjective reasoning. 
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There is a need to analyze the reliability of some 
common real time computer system architectures that are 
often employed by many small system manufacturers. This 
thesis is aimed towards analysis and design of real time 
computer systems. The results of this work will aid those 
designers that are looking for some "Cook Book" answers to 
their quest for more reliable real time computer system 
designs. The analysis should also give some direction 
towards new, more cost effective, and reliable designs. 
The analysis of some typical designs may shed some light 
on some "short cuts" that may be used to analyze the 
reliability of new real time computer systems. 
Chapter 2 of this paper describes some of the basic 
theory of reliability analysis and the effects of 
component failure modes on a system's operation. The 
following chapter then contructs some realistic models of 
common real time control systems and analyzes their 
reliability and cost. A simple analysis method that 
examines only the interfaces within a system is proposed 
in chapter 4 of this thesis. The results of the 
conventional reliability analysis are also compared to 
this new, faster analysis method. Chapter 5 then proposes 
new real time computer architectures based upon the 
proposed interface analysis method that are cost effective 
and reliable. 
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Chapter 2 
BASIC RELIABILITY THEORY AND DATA 
2.1. Basic Theory 
There are many texts that cover the field of 
reliability, from system analysis to component physics 
[4 - 8]. This thesis will limit itself to the most basic 
theory. 
The classic picture used to describe the failure 
rate of a component with respect to time is called the 
bathtub curve, which graphs the failure rate versus time. 
The bathtub curve starts at a high failure rate initially 
because of infant mortalities. The failure rate then 
falls to a steady state value that represents the useful 
life of the device. At the end of this period, the 
failure rate is expected to rise due to wear out 
mechanisms and accumulated stress. During the useful life 
of a component, it is assummed that the failure rate will 
be relatively constant. 
The constant failure ra~e is described by the 
exponential failure model. The reciprocal of the failure 
rate, Lambda, is called the Mean Time Between Failures 
(MTBF) and is an important parameter describing system 
reliability. The reliability of a device with respect to 
time may be described by the following equation 
7 
R(t) - exp (-lambda x t) . 
The failure rate for a system is the sum of the failure 
rates for its components. The reliability of a system is 
the product of the reliability of its components if every 
component failure will cause the system to fail. 
The reliability of a system with parallel elements 
where the system will function correctly even if one of 
the elements is faulty is described by the following 
equation 
R p - 1 - ( 1 - R 1 ) ( 1 - R 2 ) . . . ( 1 - Rn ) . 
Here the reliability of the parallel assembly is denoted 
by Rp and the reliability of each element is denoted by 
Rl, R2, thru Rn. If the reliability of the elements is 
the same, then the reliability of a simple two element 
parallel system may be expressed as 
Rp - 2R - RxR. 
The definition and calculation of system reliability 
can change depending on the definition of what constitutes 
a failure. The RAC Reliability Design Handbook (p.31) [4] 
gives a good example with a system built with three 
elements. Assume the following system architecture: 
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Let Rl = R2 = 0.85, and RJ - 0.99, and the time period is 
set at one hundred hours. 
The nonredundant system, without element #2, would have 
a calculated reliability of Rs= Rl x RJ = 0.842 or a 
MTBF of 575 hours. If the redundant element #2 is added 
to the system, the reliability is calculated as Rs= Rl x 
R2 x RJ = 0.715 or the MTBF = 298 hours. At first glance 
it would appear that the extra components of the redundant 
element greatly reduced the reliability of the system. 
However, there are twp important aspects of reliability. 
The unscheduled maintenance reliability, is defined in 
terms of any failure that is considered significant and 
requires service before the system is regarded as fully 
functional. The mission reliability comes into picture 
when a failure is visibly detrimental to the operation of 
the system before it is considered a fault. The mission 
reliability is calculated as 
Rs= [2Rl - (rl x rl)] x R3 = 0.97, 
which is considerably higher than the maintenance 
reliability. 
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The definition of what constitutes a failure will 
dramatically affect the calculated reliability of a 
system. The addition of circuitry to promote system 
reliability may harm a manufacturer's reputation for 
reliability if many service calls are generated by 
failures in the redundant circuitry. Even though most of 
the failures will not be "critical", the customer will 
only know that the "darn machine broke again". 
2.2. Failure Modes And Failure Mechanisms 
As far as this thesis is concerned, the term 
"failure mechanism" will represent the means by which the 
failure occured. The failure mode indicates the symptom 
of the failure as observed by the system. There are many 
opportunities for latent IC failures to be introduced into 
a system, including the manufacturing of the integrated 
circuits, and the handling of the components as they are 
packaged, tested, shipped, and assembled into systems. 
During the manufacture of integrated circuits, the 
primary mechanisms of failure are metalization failures, 
poor wire bonds, and photolithography errors. During 
shipment and handling, the primary cause of failures is 
due to electrostatic discharges that damage the integrated 
circuit by vaporizing metalization or puncturing oxide 
layers. Another source of failures is the misuse of the 
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device within a circuit, such as a logic design error that 
allows two different bus drivers connected to the same 
signal to be turned on at the same time. This contention 
can allow excessive currents to flow through the drivers 
and cause them to fail. Some system design flaws can 
cause problems through secondary effects such as excessive 
thermal cycling of the components that causes metal 
fatigue within the integrated circuit or the PCB. 
The design induced failure is difficult to reduce to 
an identifiable quantity for purposes of discussion of 
fault tolerant architectures. For a specific class of 
design flaws, such as bus buffer contention, it may be 
possible to design a system to be resistant to that fault 
but the obvious question would be "If one can predict a 
system's response to a design failure, why not use that 
knowledge to prevent the design error from being made?". 
Many design errors can be independent of the system 
architecture, such as excessive thermal loading due to 
poor packaging of the system. For the purpose of this 
thesis, it will be assumed that the implementation of a 
system will be free of hardware design errors. 
The obvious method to increase the reliability of 
a system is to use components that fail less frequently. 
Many of the failure mechanisms for integrated circuits may 
not become visible immediately to the system. Often the 
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failures occur days or weeks after the event that provoked 
the failure. The most common means to guard against these 
"time bombs" is to burn-in the components and the 
completed assemblies at elevated temperatures to hasten 
the latent failure in becoming visible. The use of 
temperature cycling and vibration are also used to shake 
up the components in an attempt to expose the marginal 
devices or assemblies. The net result of these burn-in 
proceedures is to remove the infant mortalities. The 
components that do fail later, should do so randomly with 
respect to time and device type. The typical paper on 
reliability and/or fault tolerant systems design assumes 
that the failures are random in nature and that they are 
equal in effect to the system. This is blatantly not 
true, for example: If a bus connected device's output 
shorts to ground, it may disable all transactions on that 
bus. But if the device fails as an open, then the bus may 
function properly except for the failed device. The 
failure modes of integrated circuits should be considered 
in the design of fault tolerant real time controls. 
Information on actual component failure modes and 
failure rates is limited to a few sources [9 - 11]. 
The premier source for information on the ways in which 
real components fail in real world systems is the 
Reliability Analysis ceµter at the Rome Air Development 
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Center at Griffiss Airforce Base in New York. According 
to the RAC Microcircuit Device Reliability Field 
Experience Analysis study (1985), the major failure modes 
per device catagory are: 
Non Hermetic Bipolar Digital Logic 
Open < 1.0 % 
Short < 1.0 % 
Degraded - 70.0 % 
Functional Anomaly - 20.0 % 
Mechanical Anomaly - 10.0 % 
Non Hermetic MOS Digital Logic 
Open - 6.0 % 
Short - 1.0 % 
Degraded - 43.0 % -
Functional Anomaly - 48.0 % 
Mechanical Anomaly - 2.0 ~ - 0 
Non Hermetic Bipolar Interface 
Open - 11.0 ~ - 0 
Short < 1.0 ~ 0 
Degraded - 53.0 ~ 0 
Functional Anomaly - 30.0 ~ 0 
Mechanical Anomaly - 5.0 ~ 0 
Non Hermetic MOS Interface 
Open - 29.0 ~ 0 
Short - 29.0 ~ 0 
Degraded - 14.0 ~ 0 
Functional Anomaly - 0.0 ~ 0 
Mechanical Anomaly - 28.0 ~ - 0 
Non Hermetic Memory (MOS) 
Open - 1.0 % 
Short - 1.0 % 
Degraded - 74.0 % 
Functional Anomaly - 23.0 % 
Mechanical Anomaly - 1.0 % 
Non Hermetic VLSI (MOS) 
Open - 6.0 % 
Short - 2.0 % 
Degraded - 17.0 % 
Functional Anomaly - 69.0 9-: 0 
Mechanical Anomaly - 6.0 9-: 0 
13 
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The expected failure rate per million device hours 
for the different classes of devices and their technology 
is as follows: 
Bipolar Logic - 0.3 
MOS Logic - 0.3 
Bipolar Interface - 0.25 
MOS Interface = 0.25 
MOS Memory - 0.06 to 1.0 
MOS VLSI - 0.75 
The RAC study found that memory failure rates seem to be 
independent of complexity and highly sporadic according to 
specific components or vendors. The reported failure 
rates for the different kinds of integrated circuits are 
about equal, and will be standardized as 0.3 failures per 
million hours. 
2.3. Other Reliability Considerations 
The reduction of the temperature in which a 
control system operates, and the reduction of system 
interconnections are means of achieveing greater system 
reliability, as detailed in Appendix A. 
The temperature of the device has a strong effect on 
the expected device reliability. For bipolar devices, the 
failure rate doubles for each ten degree Centigrade rise 
in junction temperature. CMOS device failure rates triple 
for each ten degree rise in temperature. 
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An integrated circuit that was screened to 883B 
levels and used in a typical industrial control 
environment has the following calculated reliability: 
Failure rate - 0.283 failures per million hours. 
This calculated failure rate is very close to the observed 
failure rates for ICs as observed by RAC. 
The only parameters for device reliability that the 
system designer has some control of are device screening 
and the ambient temperature in which the ICs operate. 
The benefit of lower component operating temperature 
and device screening on the predicted reliability of a 
component are applicable to all designs of real time 
computer systems. Appendix B lists some typical 
components and their cost when procurred with different 
screening levels. A screening level of class D, which 
results in a doubling in predicted reliability for a 
component over an unscreened part, costs about fifteen 
cents per component. This additional cost may raise the 
component cost of a system by ten percent which is not 
excessive. Additional screening to level B will increase 
the component cost by four hundred percent! This extra 
cost prohibits the use of such components in lieu of proper 
system design in most reliable real time computer systems. 
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Chapter 3 
CONSTRUCTION OF REAL TIME COMPUTER SYSTEM MODELS 
3.1. Introduction 
To accurately analyze different architectures for 
real time computer systems requires the development of 
realistic model designs. Simply drawing box diagrams of 
proposed systems will inevitably result in the over 
simplification of a design, and the results of any 
reliability analysis will be overly optimistic. 
3.2. Performance Requirements 
The purpose of a Real Time Computer System 
is to perform a productive, useful task. A machine tool 
control may supervise a machine with five axis of motion 
to a precision of one ten thousandth of an inch while the 
axes move at four hundred inches per minute. The motions 
of the axes might be synchronized with the revolution of 
the cutting tool, turning at ten thousand revolutions per 
minute. If a machine control has a resolution of 0.0005 
inch and is moving at 400 inches per minute, then the 
control must calculate 13,333 points per second~ If the 
machine motion is in four axes (table x,y,z and spindle), 
then 53,333 sets of calculations must be performed each 
second. Additionally, the control must perform other jobs 
16 
such as interpreting the operator commands and displaying 
current machine position while communicating with other 
control systems or central computers. With resolution of 
0.0005 inch and allowable dimensions of 1000 inches, math 
operations require a minimum of 26 bits of precision, 
which is usually handled as 32 bit integers or 64 bit 
floating point values. A point's calculation may require 
a minimum of two additions, four subtractions, and six 
comparisons for a simple circle. A three dimensional 
spiral may require two additions, a subtraction, four 
multiplies, and two divisions for each calculated point. 
A very important requirement of a machine tool control is 
its ability to guarantee that the path calculations will 
be'<lone in real time as needed. A failure in delivering 
the proper commands to the machine's servo motors at the 
proper time can cause the destruction of the work piece 
through the introduction of DWELL marks or cause operator 
injury by overloading a cutting tool and causing the tool 
to shatter. In addtion, the machine tool control must 
monitor the operation of the servo motors to insure that 
they are positioning the work piece and cutting tool as 
commanded. One can thus see that the real time computing 
workload is beyond the capabilites of most moderate size 
computer systems. 
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Another example of a high performance real time 
system is medical equipment used to collect and display 
vast amounts of data, often requiring many CRT displays 
just to present the data in a convenient form. A hospital 
patient monitoring system may collect and display the 
following waveforms: ECG, EEG, Saturated Oxygen, multiple 
Blood Pressures (invasive and noninvasive), Respiratory 
02, CO2, N20, and Anesthetic Agent, as well as Breathing 
Pressure and Volume. In addition to real time waveforms, 
relatively slow changing data such as the temperature, and 
computeJ values such as the Pulse rate is collected and 
displayed. Information such as that from a Blood Gas 
Analysis machine may be acquired through communications 
links within the hospital. The collected data must be 
sorted and prioritized, and the proper alarm conditions 
must be recognized and annunciated. The data and alarm 
information is then cataloged in an internal memory for 
trending purposes. The trending of data can use large 
amounts of memory. For sixty data items that are sampled 
every six seconds with sixteen bit resolution for up to 
ten hours of duration, 720,000 bytes of ram is needed. 
The collection and dissemination of information can 
impose a large I/0 interrupt burden on the processor. A 
medical system might have five external communication 
channels operating at 9600 baud, an internal communication 
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channel for ECG operating at 38.4 K baud, two channels 
operating at 4800 baud for data such as saturated oxygen 
(SA02) and noninvasive blood pressure (NIBP), and a 9,600 
baud link to communicate with a respiratory gas analysis 
device. These communication ports can generate 10,560 
interrupts per second just for receiving data. If the 
ports are 70% utilized, then a realistic figure of 7,392 
interrupts is obtained. These communication ports also 
have transmitting channels that are typically 20% 
utilized, they generate an additional 2,112 interrupts per 
second. The system will generate its own interrupts for 
use by its operating system. A total load of 10,504 
interrupts per second is reasonable for a real time 
control system! A typical Interrupt Service Routine (ISR) 
may have twenty instructions. Therefore the work load for 
just handling these interrupts, may be more than 0.2 MIPS 
(Million Instructions Per Second). If a large operating 
operating system must be involved to process the acquired 
data, the interrupt overhead can easily exceed 1.0 MIPS. 
To make real time industrial control systems more 
''User Friendly", many systems are incorporating large 
amounts of text containing operating instructions, 
warnings and equipment checkout lists. The displays have 
become more graphically oriented, often including diagrams 
on how to service the machine. These displays and tests 
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require large amounts of read only memory (ROM or EPROM). 
A quarter of a megabyte would support about a dozen pages 
of text and half a dozen graphically oriented screens. 
The CRT display(s) also require a lot of resources 
just to present a pleasant image to the operator. The 
control may have two monochrome displays with two level 
gray scale at a resolution of 640 by 480 pixels, requiring 
153,600 bytes of RAM for video display refresh memory. If 
color and/or higher resolution displays were desired, the 
refresh memory requirement would grow much larger. A 
large processing load is imposed just to update the image 
with new data. These displays have a total of 614,400 
pixels. A large portion (40%) of the display may be 
relatively static and require little updating except when 
I 
a new screen is drawn. A smaller percentage (35%) of the 
screens display numerical data (in large fonts) that is 
updated several times a second. The remainder (25%) may 
display rapidly changing data such as waveforms or images 
that is updated every 20 milliseconds. This update rate 
requires about 16,650,240 accesses to the video refresh 
memory each second! The hardware is often designed to 
access multiple pixels per memory cycle to reduce the 
required bandwidth. If the video memory is designed to 
access sixteen pixels at the same time, the number of 
accesses can be reduced to about one million per second. 
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A typical real time control system may require the 
following minimum resoures: 
1. CPU (s) sufficent for the task. (2 - 5 MIPS) 
2. 512K bytes of ROM for program storageo 
3. 512K bytes of RAM for data storage. 
4. 5 - 8 Serial ports, to internal/external devices. 
5. CRT Display logic, lk x lk by 4 planes (minimum). 
6. Key Panel interface logic. 
7. Audio Alarm Circuitry. 
8. System Clocks and Real-Time Clock. 
9. Machine dependent Analog Input/Output. 
10. Machine dependent Digital Input/Output. 
Appendix C lists some commercially available real-
time control systems and the system resources that are 
allocated in their design. 
3.3. System Cost/Complexity Constants 
An analysis of a variety of microprocessor based 
PCBs (Appendix C) shows that an "average" integrated 
circuit costs about ten dollars when installed into a PCB 
and it occupies 1.7 square inches. Therefore, a standard 
real time industrial control system limited to four 
thousand dollars cost, would have about four hundred 
integrated circuits and occupies 680 square inches of 
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printed circuit board area. Obviously, a system designed 
with VLSI components could be smaller with regard to PCB 
area and component count, but the component cost would be 
greater. Custom designed integrated circuits reduce 
system cost and size, which in turn allows fault tolerance 
logic addition; but the additional design effort needed to 
create custom integrated circuits reduces the design 
resources available to design the product itself. . A given 
allocation of design resources limits the total system 
complexity. A modest size design team may be limited to 
"pushing commercially available res around a PCB into 
different configurations in a hope of reaching a 
reasonably effective design". The data in appendix C 
shows that in a typical system, fifty percent of the chips 
might be relegated to Input/Output functions. That leaves 
about two hundred chips to perform the computational 
tasks, store the program and data, and if there are any 
"left - over" to provide for the system's fault tolerance 
features. It is reasonable to assume that fault tolerance 
circuitry be nominally limited to fifteen percent of the 
system's total cost. The primary means to provide for a 
fault tolerant system might be embodied in architecture of 
the system(12 - 19]. The larger challenge is to design a 
moderate cost, fault tolerant architecture. 
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3.4. Overview of Model Architectures 
The simplest and the most common architecture for 
real time industrial control systems is the standard micro 
processor bus system that incorporates a single processor 
with memory and Input/Output circuitry. Its logic may be 
totally contained on a single printed circuit card, or it 
may reside on many PCB cards that communicate with 
address, data, and control buses. Most personal computer 
systems are organized in this fashion. This format will, 
for the purposes of discussion, be called the "Standard 
Bus". The chief advantages of the Standard Bus is its 
simple design, ease of expansion (just add more PCB 
cards), and the availability of many board level micro 
processor based PCBs from a large selection of vendors. 
An example of such a system is the MultiBus system 
promoted by Intel Inc .. The chief disadvantage of the 
standard bus configuration is its lack of tolerance for 
faults that occur on the buses as there is no means to 
isolate faults. The cost of the standard bus is highly 
dependent on the implementation and partitioning of the 
system. If the system can reside on a single printed 
circuit board, the standard bus may be the most cost 
effective architecture. When the standard bus is divided 
into many different PCBs, the cost of the 
23 
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interface circuitry may dominate all other system 
components. 
A more advanced version of the standard bus would 
be a scheme where multiple microprocessors would share 
resources on a Global Bus but they would have access to 
their own private resources (such as memory or I/0) over a 
Local Bus. These processors are considered to be tightly 
coupled because they share resources. An example of 
this archtitecture is Motorola's VME system. This kind of 
system will be called a "Complex Bus". Obviously, this 
scheme seems to promise the ability to maintain some form 
of continued system operation in the advent of a fault in 
the Global bus because the individual processors may 
continue to access their resources through their private 
(local) buses. The increased fault tolerance for this 
system inccurs the cost of the additional buses. 
The Complex Bus scheme has a weakness where if a 
fault such as a "rampant processor" took control of the 
Global Bus, it may effectively lock out all of the other 
processors from gaining access to the global bus and the 
shared resources (such as memory). For the cost of some 
additional resources, each processor could be made self 
sufficent with regards to its basic needs for memory and 
I/0. These microprocessors could communicate with each 
24 
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other over a communications bus instead of a basic micro 
processor bus. Instead of an address being presented by 
a processor and a data value expected in return, the 
protocol would be at a higher level where commands would 
be issued and complex multibyte responses would be 
returned by another processor. This system is called 
a loosely coupled Distributed Peer Processor System, where 
each processor has approximately the same resources and 
status within the system. In this scheme, it would be 
difficult for a failed microprocessor to disrupt the 
operation of another processor. The main drawback of this 
design is its cost; each processor may be limited in 
performance and resources because of the need for 
redundant resources and the support circuitry to make 
these resources usable. If many processors are 
implemented, each may be reduced to a very small size. 
Instead of a single thirty-two bit processor, a dozen 
eight bit processors may be needed to support the work 
load. The limited processing power of a smaller processor 
may require large amounts of data be transfered between 
each processor, so each can process the data in parallel. 
A large portion of each processor's resources, hardware 
and processing power, may be spent on the communications 
channel. To reduce the latency of data transmissions 
between the processor modules, high speed parallel 
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communication channels are often used. These parallel 
interfaces put additional hardware burden on each 
overloaded processor module. 
The fourth architecture to be considered here is the 
"Octopus" system where a large central processor 
communicates with a satelite system of smaller processors 
over a number of slow speed serial channels. If the 
system can be partitioned into modules that require low 
bandwidth communications between the modules, then the 
hardware resources that would be spent on high speed 
communications can be devoted to more productive uses. 
The octopus system is a Master-Slave organization. If 
any of the slave processors fail, it will be unlikey to 
cause the entire system to fail. But if the master 
processor suffers a fault, the system might be disabled. 
The "Trick" to a successful system design with this 
archtecture is to design the slave processors to be 
able to operate the system in an automatic mode if the 
communication with the master processor is lost. 
There are other architectures that are very fault 
tolerant through the virtues of massive redundancy. The 
space shuttle and modern aircraft may use three or more 
processor subsystems operating in parallel. The results 
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of each processor is examined by a voting circuit. The 
voting circuit will detect errors by looking for outputs 
that do not agree with the others. If an error is 
detected, the faulty unit will be turned off or 
disregarded until it is repaired. This scheme is the most 
reliable known, but it is also the most expensive design. 
Other special purpose architectures, such as arrays 
of processors, may be fault tolerant because the size 
of the processor, and its data, may be small compared to 
that of an entire system. An example: An image processing 
array could have some faulty elements that are 
responsible for processing the data for a few pixels 
within an image containing a million pixels. Such faulty 
pixels may never be noticed in the overall image. 
It is reasonable to assume that technology will 
advance to allow the implementation of redundant or 
massively parallel arrays of processors on a single 
printed circuit board in the near future. But it will be 
an uncommon event within realtime industrial control 
systems because of the ever increasing demands from them 
for higher performance at lower cost. The current 
architectures such as the standard bus, complex bus, the 
distributed peer system (communications bus), and the 
octopus system are likely to remain in use for the 
foreseeable future. 
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3.5. Comparisons of the Design Examples 
The detailed descriptions of the model systems are 
in Appendix E. The systems are described by lists of 
their components. The listed components are organized 
into functional groups with accompanying descriptions. 
The listed components are typical for the function 
performed but other devices may be applicable. 
The overall integrated circuits (IC) count for the 
four design examples are: 
Architecture IC Count I/0 Cost IF Cost 
-----------------------------------------
------------
Standard Bus 
Complex Bus 
152 
270 
Communications Bus 222 
Octopus System 153 
40% 
39% 
40% 
58% 
22% 
33% 
28% 
11% 
The winner for lowest component count is the 
standard microprocessor bus which narrowly beats the 
Octopus system. The actual implementation of these two 
systems determines the lowest component count. If the 
octopus system is implemented with descrete 
microprocessors instead of microcontrollers, the standard 
bus design would have even a larger component count 
advantage. If the standard bus design is built on smaller 
printed circuit boards, the additional boards and 
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their required bus interfaces would greatly increase its 
system component count. 
The most expensive design is the Complex bus with 
almost twice the component count of the standard bus or 
the octopus system. The additional cost is primarily due 
to the redundant bus interfaces, and the redundant control 
logic and memory for the extra processor. Most 
applications can be mapped onto a complex bus system. 
The system can reside on one of the processors, and the 
user interface with its video graphics interface can 
reside on the other processor. 
The communications bus example is most difficult 
to analyze because of its significantly different 
structure. If the design is adequate for the application, 
then its cost of 222 chips is approximately "average". 
If the design is implemented with 16 bit processors, its 
cost increases by at least forty more chips. The sixteen 
bit communications bus system is as costly as the complex 
bus. Like the complex bus, the predominant cost in this 
case also is the interface logic. 
The Octopus system has less than one third, by 
component count, the interface ciruitry of the other 
systems. The obvious reason for this is the use of serial 
interfaces instead of the usual parallel interfaces. 
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RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF MODEL SYSTEMS 
4.1. Conventional Reliability Analysis 
The calculated reliability of each architecture 
model in this thesis is based only on the integrated 
circuits. The passive components such as carbon 
composition resistors and ceramic capacitors used for 
signal termination and power supply bypassing have failure 
rates that are one to two orders of magnitude lower than 
those for integrated circuits. Two failure rates are 
calculated for each architecture model, the service MTBF 
and the mission MTBF. 
The service MTBF is just a summation of the failure 
rates for all of the integrated circuits. The mission 
MTBF calculation is more complex. It is assumed that 
each model system has enough diagnostic hardware and 
software to determine if non critical devices, such as I/0 
are functioning properly. This is needed to prevent the 
use of a system that appears to work but would give 
incorrect responses. The critical device failures are 
expected to either prevent the system from booting up 
and/or determining that a major fault has occurred. Often 
the microprocessor and/or system will incorporate a "watch 
dog timer" or other monitoring logic to shut the system 
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down to prevent erraticoperation in the advent of a 
critical failure. 
Typically, a bus connected device that suffers a 
shorted failure mode on a pin that connects to a bus will 
cause the system to fail catastrophically because the 
bused signal line becomes unusable. If the device fails 
as an open circuit, then the signal line is still usable 
by other devices. When a device is connected in series 
with a bused signal, then either a short or open will make 
the signal line unusable. This discussion leads to the 
following assumptions (rules) to determine which failures 
are critical to the system: 
1. The Microprocessor, its clock, control, and reset 
circuitry are mission critical devices. 
2. The bus interface buffers and transceivers are 
considered critical. The RAC data shows that a large 
percentage have opens or shorts as failure modes (11]. 
3. Any integrated circuit that can disable the processor 
or disable a majority of the system I/0 through its 
failure will be considered critical. 
4. Any integrated circuit, whose failure will completely 
disable the video displays is considered critical if 
there are no alternate means of displaying data to the 
operator. 
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5. Memory devices are not critical. The RAC data shows 
few memory failures as open or shorts. If the system 
boot code occupies a small percentage of the system 
memory, then a failure in the boot code is unlikely. 
If the boot code is readable, then assume system 
critical code will be duplicated in different areas of 
memory. CRC codes can be used to verify the integrity 
of each block of memory. 
6. Bus connected devices that are on the other side of a 
bus buffer device from the critical microprocessor 
circuitry are not considered critical. 
7. Microcontrollers, whose primary task are as I/0 
controllers, are not mission critical. 
8. All non micro-processor bus connected I/0 devices 
are not critical devices. Their failure will not 
disrupt the operation of the microprocessor. 
There are failure modes that can disrupt almost 
any system, even if the device is not considered -critical 
to the mission. For example: an I/0 buffer could suffer 
a short between the system power and ground that would 
cause the voltage to other integrated circuits to fail. 
This event is highly unlikely because the typical power 
supply can gene~ate a large enough current to burn out the 
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bonding wires that supply power to the faulted integrated 
circuit before the system power fails. 
Rule four, which states that any integrated circuit 
that can completely disrupt the video display will be 
considered mission critical, was added to list because of 
the recognition that "human factors" considerations are 
important. If the video interface is the only interface 
between the machine and the operator, then its complete 
failure will probably tramatize the operator and the 
machine will be considered hopelessly and dangerously 
broken. Even if the processor was still capable of 
maintaining control of the machine, no one would know it 
or believe it. Partial failures such as missing pixels, 
scrambled lines, or rolling images, would not cause such 
panic as would a complete failure. The operator would 
still see ''something" and realize that the system was 
still attempting to operate. 
A system built with multiple processing elements 
should be analyzed in a manner similar to a conventional 
system. Each processor module should be treated as a 
component and the above eight rules should be applied. 
The standard bus design example's critical 
components were the processor, processor clock, reset 
logic, control decode PLDs, and the bus buffers for 
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address, data, and control signals. The interrupt 
controller, interrupt signal buffers, and DMA signal 
buffers were not considered mission critical. 
. It lS 
assumed that the control decode PLDs will disable such 
functions until the processor deems that such functions 
are operating properly and are needed. On the I/0 board, 
the 95C60 video processor, video clock, the buffers for 
address, dat~, and control are also critical to the 
. . 
mission. 
The Complex bus design example has the same critical 
components as the standard bus and its adds the local bus 
buffers to the critical components list. The complex bus 
then pays dearly because there are two processors in the 
system, thus doubling the number of critical components! 
The common video board adds the video controller, clock, 
video control PLDs and the bus buffers to the critical 
device list. The logic used to share the video board 
between the processors is also critical. The I/0 boards 
on the VMX buses however are not critical. The dual 
processor system does not provide enough fault isolation 
or redundancy to insure the continued operation of the 
system in case of a fault to be able to consider that each 
processor is not critical. This is not a clear cut 
decision but made as it was because of the heavy 
dependence on a common video and a lack of redundant I/0. 
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The communications bus design example list of 
critical components was primarily made up of the parts 
on the Internal Communications Controller. This board, 
should it fail, would disable both video display 
processor boards. Its failure would also prevent each 
I/0 module from communicating with each other. The only 
components on the ICC board that are not critical to the 
mission are those devoted to the interface with the 
External Comminications Controller, and the audio output 
circuitry. In this rare case, the memory devices will be 
considered critical because it is unlikely that such as 
small processor subsystem would have additional resources 
to provide for redundant blocks of memory or program. 
The bus interface devices on the I/0 modules are also 
capable of disabling the system if they should fail. 
The Octopus system design example's critical 
component list only includes the usual, the processor, 
clock, control logic, video processor, video clock and 
logic. The lack of bus buffers greatly reduces the number 
of critical components as compared to the other design 
examples. 
The Table 4.1 summarizes the results of the critical 
device analysis rules when they were applied to the 
example designs. 
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Table 4.1. Design example critical IC tally. 
Total "OVERHEAD" 
Design Total res critical res Critical res 
------
--------- ------------
------------
Standard Bus 152 48 37 
Complex Bus 270 87 53 
Communications Bus 222 37 13 
Octopus System 153 20 18 
----------------------------------------------------------
The component counts can be converted into system 
MTBF values assuming a standard 0.3 failures per million 
hours MTBF for the integrated circuits as shown in table 
4. 2. 
----------------------------------------------------------
Table 4. 2. MTBF Summary 
Design Service MTBF Mission MTBF 
------ ------------
-------------
Standard Bus 21,929 hours 69,444 hours 
Complex Bus 12,345 hours 38,314 hours 
Communications Bus 15,015 hours 90,090 hours 
Octopus System 21,786 hours 166,666 hours 
-------~--------------------------------------------------
The standard bus design example appears to be a 
reasonable design choice for real time operating systems . 
• 
The standard bus provides for a minimum component count, 
36 
ease of system expansion, and the best service MTBF. 
But, the standard bus does not provide the optimum mission 
MTBF. 
4.2. Reliability Calculation Through Interface Analysis 
All usefull computer systems have a common heritage, 
they all contain at least one processor, memory, control 
logic, and input/output devices. Because of cost 
limitations, most designs allocate approximately the same 
amount of system resources to perform the same task as 
other designs. The basic difference between different 
systems is in their organization. The interfaces between 
the different components represent the discretionary 
differences in each design. These interfaces also define 
the paths for data transfer within a system, and they are 
often critical to the reliability of a system. 
It should be possible to calculate the reliability 
of a computer system by analyzing the interfaces within 
the system. Such a procedure would save time, over more 
conventional methods, because the entire system would not 
have to be designed and analyzed. The procedure should 
take into consideration, the number of interfaces, the 
failure modes and rates of the components, and any 
redundancy built into the interface. The remainder of the 
system will be factored into the reliability equation as a 
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constant based on the estimated total component count of 
the system. 
Any interface can be modeled as a chain of four 
elements that connect one module to another module as 
shown in figure 4.1. 
Module A Module B 
Bus Buffer A Buffer B Bus 
Interface Interface 
(BIA) (IBA) (IBB) (BIB) 
I ·~ 
Fig.4.1. Interface between two modules. 
Many interfaces may not include all of these elements, or 
elements may be combined within a component. Conversely, 
many components may be required to implement a single 
element of an interface. The module A bus interface 
represents the connection between the interface and the 
system bus of module A. similarily, the module B bus 
interface is the connection between the interface and the 
main bus of module B. If these bus interfaces fail in a 
shorted mode, then the respective bus will be critically 
faulted. The buffers A and Bare the physical buffers 
(amplifiers) that are typically used to provide the proper 
voltage and drive at the interface connection. These 
buffers are often built into the bus interface devices. 
It's possible to combine all four functions in a single 
device! It's common to use a bus buffer such as a 74ALS541 
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within a PCB to increase the drive capability of a micro-
processor output. Thus interfaces may exist within a 
single PCB or may extend centimeters or kilometers to 
another PCB. 
The portions on any interface that may be designed 
in a redundant manner are confined to the portion of the 
module interfaces that connect to each other through the 
interface buffers. Any redundant interface must have a 
circuit or device that selects, combines, or monitors the 
redundant paths. At some level, this path selection 
circuit is not redundant, and it must be connected to the 
system bus. To see this, consider that the module 
interfaces are implemented with VLSI octal UARTS, the 
buffers are RS-422 driver and receivers. To allow for 
fault tolerance, two different serial ports in each octal 
uart are used to implement a single communications channel. 
The portion of each octal uart that connects to the bus 
is shared by all of the serial ports and therefore is not 
redundant. The portion of the octal uart that is involved 
with a specific serial link may fail with out affecting 
the other serial links. This portion of the VLSI device 
may be considered to be a part of the redundant path. 
A similar example could be designed with triple 
redundant open collector parallel bus buffers that have 
been resistively connected together at their outputs. 
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Their collectively tied inputs and their resistively tied 
outputs represent portions of the interface that are not 
redundant. 
The interface model's reliability can be calculated 
easily if each element is considered separately. An 
interface circuit is shown in fig.4.2 to clarify Fig. 4.1. 
~ 
CL-CD180 26LS31 26LS33 CL-CD180 
UART RS-422 RS-422 UART 
Driver Receiver 
(BIA) (IBA) (IBB) (BIB) 
Fig. 4.2. Example Interface Circuit. 
The portion of BIA that connects to the bus of 
Module A is by definition a critical component. The 
failure rate for the BIA interface element is represented 
by IBIAFR. It is assummed that one half of the failures 
for this portion of the interface occur on the bus 
boundary. The portion of these failures that are shorts, 
which are always critical, is represented by BIAFM. The 
failure rate for the bus side of BIA that is always 
critical can be calculated by the equation 
FR= 0.5 x IBIAFR x BIAFM. (4.1) 
The remainder of the other failure modes for this half of 
IBIA are taken as critical only if the signal path is 
critical. The fact of the criticality of a signal path 
is represented by the variable CP. If the path is 
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critical then CP is equal to one, otherwise it is equal to 
zero. The redundancy of the signal path will greatly 
influence the criticality of the entire interface. The 
signal path redundancy is represented by the variable 
redundancy factor (RDF). 
The RDF is calculated by taking a typical failure 
rate for an integrated circuit and modeling a system with 
two such components in parallel. The reliability is 
calculated for the parallel components using a period of 
time between two thousand hours (one working year) and 
twenty thousand hours (over two years continuous). The 
effective reduction in failure rate for the signal path 
was on the order of a factor of one thousand. For 
redundancy of more than two, the effective reduction in 
failure rates becomes on the order of one trillion. 
The remainder of the bus portion of BIA, that may 
be critical if the signal path is critical, has a failure 
rate that is described by the following equation, 
FR - (CP x RDF)x(l - BIAFM)x(0.5 xIBIAFR xBIAFM). (4.2) 
Finally, the failure rate for the portion of the bus 
interface IBA that connects to Buffer A is calculated by: 
FR - (CP x RDF) X (0.5 X IBIAFR). ( 4. 3) 
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This portion of the interface is critical only if the 
signal path is critical and only to the degree determined 
by the redundancy factor. 
The interface Buffers A and Bare critical only if 
the signal path is critical. The effective failure rate 
for these buffers and the module interfaces are 
dependent on the redundancy of the connection (RDF). 
The failure rate for both IBA and IBB is determined by: 
FR - (CP x RDF) x ( IIBAFR + IIBBFR). 
The BIB element of an interface, that connects 
the signal to module B, is divided into two halves. 
The half that connects with Buffer B (IBB) may be 
designed in a redundant manner. Its failure rate is 
described by equation 
FR - (CP x RDF) X (0.5 x IBIBFR) . 
( 4 . 4 ) 
( 4 • 5 ) 
The portion of the module interface that resides on 
Module B's bus can not be made redundant. This half of 
the IBB element is critical if the path is critical and 
its failure rate is determined by equation 
FR - CP x 0.5 x IBIBFR. (4.6) 
The total mission failure rate for a system is the 
sum of the mission failure rate of the interfaces plus the 
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mission failure rate of the rest of the system. The total 
interface failure rate is the summation of the failure 
rates for each individual interface signal. The failure 
rate equation for a given interface signal is the sum 
of equations (4.1) through (4.6). The combined equation 
is called the Interface Reliability Analysis (IRA) 
equation in this thesis and reads: 
FR= (0.5 x IBIAFR x BIAFM) 
+ [(CP x RDF) x (1 - BIAFM) x (0.5 x IBIAFR x BIAFM)] 
+ [(CP x RDF) x (0.5 x IBIAFR)] 
+ [(CP x RDF) x ( IIBAFR + IIBBFR)] 
+ [(CP x RDF) x (0.5 x IBIBFR)] 
+ [CP x 0.5 x IBIBFR], ( 4. 7) 
where IBIAFR - Individual Bus Interface A Failure rate 
BIAFM - Fraction of BIA failures as shorts 
Bipolar Interface - 0.01 
MOS Interface - 0.29 
MOS VLSI - 0.02 
CP Critical Path, 0 - No, 1 - Yes - -
RDF - Redundancy Factor -
1.0 - None 
0.001 = Redundant signal paths 
IIBAFR - Individual Interface Buffer A Failure 
IIBBFR - Individual Interface Buffer B Failure 
rate 
rate 
IBIBFR - Individual Bus Interface B Failure rate 
The equation for the failure rate of an individual 
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signal may be simplified greatly depending on the design 
of the interface. If the signal path is redundant, then 
RDF reduces most of the terms to insignificance and the 
IRA equation is reduced to: 
FR= (0.5 X IBIAFR x BIAFM) + [CP x 0.5 x IBIBFR] (4.8) 
If the path is not critical then the equation reduces even 
further to: 
FR= (0.5 x IBIAFR x BIAFM) ( 4 . 9 ) 
If the buffers are combined with the bus interfaces, and 
no redundancy exists in the critical signal paths, such as 
in a typical VME Bus interface, then the IRA equation 
reduces to 
FR= IBIAFR + IBIBFR. ( 4. 10) 
This is the typical form used in simple component count 
failure rate summation. 
The total system mission failure rate is determined 
by summing together the failure rates for each interface 
signal. This is usually easy to do because many 
interfaces are usually groups of 8, 16 or 32 similar 
signals. The totalized interface failure rate is then 
added to a constant K that represents the failure rate 
of 15% of the estimated system component count. This 
fixed percentage of the system total represents the 
processors, clocks, control circuitry, and indispensible 
input/output circuitry that every system requires. This 
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figure of fifteen percent matches the critical overhead 
of the four model systems. 
4.3. Application of the Interface Analysis Method 
For all the models under consideration, the 
following conditions exist: 
1. The interface technology is bipolar; the 
incidence of shorts is regarded as insignificant. 
2. All interface signals in the models are not of a 
redundant design. 
3. All of the interface signals for the standard 
bus, complex bus, and communications bus models 
will be considered critical. 
4. The interfaces for the standard bus, complex bus, 
and the communications bus are implemented in two 
levels. The BIA and IBA interface elements are 
combined, as are the IBB and BIB elements. 
5. All of the interfaces are implemented with eight 
bit interface res. The standard failure rate of 
0.3 failures per million hours per IC is assumed. 
The Standard Bus example has 104 interface signals. 
The calculated failure rate for all of the interfaces is 
7.8 failures per million hours. The fifteen percent 
allotment for critical overhead res, totals twenty three 
45 
ICs for the Standard Bus. The calculated total mission 
critical failure rate for the standard bus design is 14.7 
per million hours. 
The Complex Bus example has 384 interface signals. 
The calculated failure rate for all of the interfaces is 
14.4 failures per million hours. The critical overhead IC 
allotment is forty one. The predicted mission critical 
failure rate for the complex bus is 26.7 per million 
hours. 
The Communications Bus example requires a more 
sophisticated interpretation of the interface analysis 
technique. The "party-line" interface design, where many 
modules share a common bus is reduced to a simpler form 
for analysis. The six I/0 processor modules with their 
separate bus interfaces will be treated as a single 
device. This device will have a bus interface that is 
six times more complex (in component count) that 
interfaces with the internal communication controller. 
The dual CRT controllers will also be treated in a similar 
manner with respect to their interface with the internal 
communications controller (ICC). The predicted failure 
rate for the sixteen data and control signals between the 
I/0 modules and the ICC is 6.3 per million hours. The 
sixteen signals in the interface between the ICC and the 
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CRT modules are predicted to have 1.8 failures per million 
hours. The calculated total failure rate'for this system 
including the critical overhead res is 18.09 per million 
hours. 
The Communications bus example also offers another 
interpretation using the interface analysis method. The 
entire ICC module is just a portion of the interface 
between the I/0 modules, that collect the data, and the 
CRT modules, which display the data. Treating the ICC as 
a black box of interface circuitry will increase the 
calculated interface failure rate to 13.5 per million 
hours. The calculated mission failure rate for the system 
is-23.5 per million hours. This rate is significantly 
greater then the results of the first interpretation. 
This second interpretation is probably not valid since 
the other design examples were not treated in this manner, 
but it does indicate that higher level analysis to large 
systems can yield results that are "in the ball park". 
The Octopus System is another interesting test case 
for the Interface Analysis Method. The system has no 
interface signals that are critical by themselves, only 
the loss of a majority of them would be catstrophic to the 
system. The Interface Analysis Method only considers each 
interface signal by itself. The interface analysis 
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method will count only the portion of the UART in the 
Octopus design that resides on the system bus and is 
expected to fail in a shorted mode. The predicted 
interface failure rate is 0.003 per million hours. If the 
interface method did consider the entire uart and its 
clock, then the interface failure rate would be calculated 
as 0.6 per million hours. The standard critical overhead 
brings the system total failure rate to 6.888 per million 
hours. In this case, the deficiencies of the interface 
analysis method do not greatly affect the result. 
4.4. Comparison of Analysis Methods and Results 
The combined results of the conventional analysis 
method and the interface analysis method are listed in the 
table 4.3. 
Table 4.3. Comparison of Analysis Results 
Conventional 
Design Mission MTBF 
Standard Bus 69,444 hours 
Complex Bus 38,314 hours 
Communications Bus 90,090 hours 
Octopus System 166,666 hours 
Interface Method 
Mission MTBF 
68,027 hours 
37,453 hours 
104,166 hours 
145,243 hours 
~---------------------------------------------------------
The results are very close to each other, the maximum 
difference was only fifteen percent! The best correlation 
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between the two methods was on the more conventional 
architectures. The communications design example 
demonstrated that there will always be areas of analysis 
that are subjective in nature, such as what constitutes 
an interface. The octopus design example highlighted a 
weakness of the interface analysis method, where the sum 
of a design behaves differently then each component. 
The results indicate that the original hypothesis 
that the reliability of a system is primarily dictated 
by its interfaces is true. The interface Analysis method 
system offers the over worked and understaffed engineering 
departments that design real time computer systems a quick 
and accurate means for calculating the mission critical 
MTBF of a system. 
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Chapter 5 
IRA SUGGESTED ARCHITECTURES 
5.1. Future Design Considerations 
The Interface Reliability Equation gives direction 
to the task of developing more cost effective and reliable 
realtime computer architectures. This chapter is devoted 
to the discussion of design modifications to improve 
reliability. 
Note first that mission reliability can be improved 
by reducing the number and size of interfaces in a system. 
To reduce the system interfaces, one should use serial 
interfaces where possible. Secondly the technology of 
the circuitry on the system bus boundary should be chosen 
to minimize the chance of shorted failure modes which are 
catastrophic to the system. The choice of components that 
are known to have lower failure rates is also indicated by 
the equation as a good idea for the entire interface. 
The equation also indicates that redundant 
interfaces be designed into the system to improve the 
reliability of the system. The level of redundancy should 
be kept at two or three. Any additional paths will only 
reduce an already insignificant failure rate for the 
signal path but it will probably greatly increase the 
complexity, cost, and failure rate for the interface 
circuitry on the system bus boundary. This increase in 
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the boundary circuitry complexity will swamp any gains in 
reliability of the signal path. 
5.2 A New Real Time Computer Architecture 
The IRA equation can be used to guide the design of 
more reliable, cost effective real time computer systems. 
The new design will meet the performance criteria 
specified in chapter 3 while exceeding the mission MTBF of 
the previous four model designs. The new design will cost 
less than some of the previous model systems! 
The primary statement of the IRA equation is that 
the number of interfaces in the system must be minimized. 
The primary means to minimize the quantitiy of interfaces 
is to use serial rather than parallel interfaces. This 
leaves two choices for the design of the interfaces. The 
first choice could be to attempt to replace the typical 
parallel interface, that might be sixty-four bits wide, 
with a serial interface capable of the same performance. 
This decision would require extremely fast circuitry for 
serialization logic and large amounts of other circuitry 
to interface this serial logic to the system's bus. This 
action is not compatible with equation #1. 
The second design possibility is to design the 
system into sections that require low bandwidths of 
communications between each section. This design choice 
allows the use of commonly available components such as 
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UARTS which are used to serialize and deserialize data 
communication channels. These MOS VLSI components are 
easy to interface to the system bus and they support up to 
eight channels each. These facts make them ideal in 
meeting the criteria of equation #1, the use of technology 
that has few failures as shorts on the system bus, and 
few components are required to implement the function. 
Equations #2 through #5 mandate the use of redundant 
signal interconnections. The redundancy factor (RDF) can 
reduce the significance of many faults in the interface. 
A single level of redundancy will minimize the failure 
rate contributions of equations #2 through #5 by a factor 
of a thousand while increasing the contribution of 
equation #1 by only two times. 
The actual failure rate for the interface components 
is not usually under the control of the design engineer. 
Therefore the failure rate terms IBIAFR,IIBAFR,IIBBFR, 
and IBIBFR used in equations #1 through #6 provide little 
guidance in designing new computer architectures, except 
for the obvious statement of "use the most reliable 
components available''. But equations #2 through #6 do 
specify the critical path term CP which is under control 
of the designer. 
There are two approaches to making an interface (CP) 
non critical. The first method is to insure that the 
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functionality on the other side of the interface is not 
critical to the operation of the system. Typically this 
would be done by partioning the system into small enough 
pieces so that the loss of an element is not overly 
detrimental to the system. The second approach is to use 
redundancy at a higher level than specifed by the RDF 
term in the IRA equation. If the system is designed so 
that all of the elements (BIA,IBA,IBB,BIB) of an interface 
are replicated, then a given interface could be considered 
non critical because it is provided with a backup. This 
backup interface is difficult to realize in a manner that 
does not contradict the IRA equation and philosophy. 
Merely installing a second interface in parallel with the 
first will not yield a design where CP is equal to zero. 
The bus connection portions of each BIA interface element 
and the control and decision logic used to choose between 
them merely create a more complex and less reliable BIA 
bus connection circuit. If a suitable design can be 
found, then the CP term will reduce the most of the IRA 
equation to zero. 
To summerize the previous discussion, the IRA 
equation suggests a system design with a minimum number of 
low bandwidth serial interfaces to modules that are not 
too important to the system. The interfaces should be 
made redundant or non critical. A reasonable design would 
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be a central core processor with low bandwith links to 
modules that provide the input and output functions for 
the system. This is much like the Octopus system 
described in chapter 3. 
The Octopus design may be a good start as the basis 
of the IRA design but it does not meet some of the IRA 
criteria for optimum reliability. Its primary weakness 
is the lack of redundancy for the serial interfaces with 
the I/0 modules, and the lack of redundancy for the video 
interface with the displays. The Octopus design already 
uses MOS UARTS which are a reliable means of implementing 
the BIA interface element but simply using multiple 
channels of UARTS per interface will not yield non-
critical interfaces. 
The duplication of the system bus with which the 
BIA element connects would provide the means to insure 
the complete independence of the redundant interfaces. 
But the only way to provide duplicate system buses without 
incurring the cost and handicap of new internal interfaces 
is to provide the duplicate system bus through the 
implementation of a duplicate (separate) system. 
A system could be built with two octopus main 
processor boards, operating in parallel, communicating 
with a quantity of peripheral processors. Each processor 
will monitor the serial communication channels of the 
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peripheral processors at the same time. The peripheral 
processor would just provide the usual single channel 
communications interface to the main'processor, to save 
cost. The main processors would receive in a "Party line" 
manner, such as in an RS-485 circuit. The RS-485 
receivers on the main processors can be effectively 
isolated from each other with resistors. Carbon 
composition resistors have failure rates that are less 
than one hundredth of that of an integrated circuit. The 
RS-485 transmitters on the main processors may be "wired-
or" together at the peripheral processors since they 
have Tri-State outputs. A better method would be to 
provide two receivers on the peripheral processors to 
provide improved isolation between the transmitters on the 
main processors. Figure 5.1 shows the block diagram of 
the proposed Dual Octopus System. Through hardware, 
software, or mechanical means, one processor will be 
defined as the primary processor and the other as the 
secondary (or standby) processor. The primary processor 
will initiate all communications with the peripheral 
processors. The main processors will work the received 
data in parallel. They would be running identical 
software and they may not "know" of each other's 
existence. They would generate identical outputs to the 
CRT displays, peripherals, and other devices. Only the 
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"active" processor would be connected to the "real world". 
-------------------------------------------------
-----------
Peripheral Processors 
#1 #2 #3 
I I 
1 
M 
. 
a1n 
A B Proc essors 
J 
l r 
#4 #5 #6 
Fig.5.1. Proposed Dual Octopus System 
The determination of which processor is the Primary 
or active processor must be made with reliable circuitry. 
This circuitry will be very critical to the mission MTBF 
because its failure could disable both processors. The 
simplest means is to let the operator decide when a 
critical fault has occured and flip a switch that will 
select the outputs of ~he secondary processor. This 
backup processor is what is often called a "Hot Standby" 
backup because it is always running when the primary 
processor is operating. The hot standby operation allows 
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both processors to maintain the same data bases and 
insure that they will behave in a similar manner to 
future events. A more sophisticated means of processor 
selection could include some voting logic to "throw the 
switch" automatically. 
The decision circuitry used to select the "active" 
processor becomes an interface subject to the IRA 
equation! It would appear that we traded the problem of 
isolating the communications interfaces from each other 
with the problem of isolating the systems from the voting 
logic. It may seem like there is no way to avoid the 
problem of interdependency of interfaces in designing 
truely redundant interfaces as discussed in the IRA 
interface element definition. But the other approach 
to be discussed next relieves us of this difficulty and 
achieves the maximum possible reliability. 
An alternate method for determining which processor 
is the active processor is not to make that decision on a 
global level. Instead of switching off the inputs and 
outputs to an entire processor with a system wide logic 
circuit, each peripheral processor will decide, by itself, 
if it believes the main processor is operating properly. 
If it decides the processor it is communicating with is 
faulty, it can select to listen to the other main 
processor. If a particular peripheral board makes a wrong 
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decision, at worst, only that board's functionality is 
lost to the system. Under normal conditions, both 
processors are operating, so the peripheral processor will 
continue to receive commands and supply data to the 
system. 
This decoupling of the voting logic from the main 
processors highlights a "window of opportunity" allowed by 
the IRA equation. The IRA equation promotes, with lower 
calculated failure rates (CP=O), systems that are built 
with virtual interfaces instead of physical interfaces. 
The fact that both main processors of a dual octopus 
system are operating in parallel with no direct inter-
connection, allows the complete isolation of each other. 
Their only link to each other is through the commonality 
of the data they receieve from the outside world. This 
commonality of data becomes the virtual interface between 
the two main processors. The peripheral processors are 
independently evaluating the responses from the main 
processors and deciding which is worth listing to. The 
only requirement the design of these peripheral processors 
must meet to satisfy the IRA's CP term for non criticality 
is that each peripheral processor does not become so 
important to the system that its failure will be critical. 
The IRA equation appears to suggest that distributed 
systems provide the best opportunity for the most reliable 
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real time computer system designs. The complete 
independence between modules must be maintained, merely 
designing redundancy or modularity into a system will not 
usually result in a more reliable system. 
The design of the Dual Octopus System can be 
identical with the regular octopus system described in 
appendix E with the addition of another main processor 
board. The component count for a dual octopus system is 
240 integrated circuits. Implementing the decision making 
circuitry with the peripheral processors will add no extra 
cost to the system. The shorted failure mode is rare for 
bipolar interface res which are typically used as RS-485 
interface drivers. Therefore, the main processor 
drivers may be wired or together with little risk of a 
fault disabling the communications links to the peripheral 
processors. This eliminates the need for dual receivers 
on the peripheral processors. 
The resultant design has no critical interfaces. 
The service MTBF works out to as 13,888 hours. The system 
reliability with no failures in both main processor boards 
for 2,000 hours is 0.997413. The effective mission MTBF 
is 772,136 hours or 88 years. If minor failures are 
tolerable in both main processor boards, then the 
effective mission MTBF is 1,604 years. 
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The Dual Octopus System provides the greatest 
functionality per integrated circuit of any of the model 
systems. Compared to the Complex bus design, the dual 
octopus system uses twelve percent less components while 
providing three hundred and sixty times the mission 
reliabiliy (over a resonable period of time). 
The interface reliability analysis technique with 
its unique attention to component failure modes has guided 
the design of the Dual Octopus System. The conventional 
reliability analysis techniques do not provide any 
assistance toward the design of realtime computer system 
architectures. 
The increasing component complexity in VLSI devices, 
the dual octopus system will continue to offer improved 
performance/price ratios as compared to the other 
architectures. Most VLSI res are limited by the number of 
pins available in their packages. By definition, the 
parallel bus buffer or transceiver IC is pin limited, so 
there is little chance of improving the functionality of 
such devices. Serial communication res are not as 
constrained by pinout limitations. Parallel interface 
ICs' primary benefit to system design is their ability to 
provide high bandwidth resource (primarily memory) 
expansion, but VLSI memories have reduced this need 
because large amounts can now be placed onto a single PCB. 
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Chapter 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
The standard bus architecture that dominates most 
Realtime Control System designs is a reasonable design 
that combines low cost with reasonable reliability. It 
is possible for a designer to design a more costly and yet 
less reliable system with out much difficulty. 
This thesis has analyzed (for reliability) four 
multiprocessor bus architectures drawn from various real 
time control applications. It has also developed a new 
procedure to carry out such analysis by examining only the 
system interfaces. This procedure summerized by the 
Interface Reliability Analysis equation (IRA) is quick, 
painless and gives results fairly close to the long and 
tedious conventional analysis. The new Interface 
Reliability Analysis equation takes into account 
parallelism, commonality of bus, and other practical 
limitations of real time control systems. But its most 
important benefit is its help in designing more reliable 
systems. The implementation of a given architecture can 
make or break a design. A design that is spread over many 
small printed circuit boards will have more internal 
interfaces and decreased reliability according to IRA. 
The partitioning of a given implementation across 
different boards can affect what is considered a critical 
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component, and therefore affecting the mission MTBF. IRA 
also suggests that real interfaces should be replaced with 
virtual interfaces and parallel interfaces ~ith serial. 
A highly reliable multiprocessor architecture called 
the "Dual octopus System" is designed with the help of IRA 
and it shows that for an additional expenditure of ninety 
!Cs or one thousand dollars, one can improve the system 
reliability eighty fold. 
Other factors that affect the system reliability are 
the operating temperature and the component reliability. 
A reduction of a system's ambient temperature by ten 
degrees C. can double or triple the system's reliability. 
A temperature reduction of twenty to thirty degrees, can 
produce larger improvements in system reliability than the 
extremes in system architecture described in this paper! 
The use of proper screening programs for integrated 
circuits can reduce the expected failure rates for !Cs by 
a factor of at least five as compared to commercial grade 
integrated circuits. A combination of temperature 
reduction and component screening can improve the MTBF of 
a system by twenty times! 
The combined improvements of component screening, 
temperature reduction, careful system design, and 
redundant critical logic can improve the expected mission 
system critical MTBF by Three Thousand-Five Hundred times! 
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APPENDIX A 
EQUATIONS FOR COMPONENT RELIABILITY PREDICTION 
The Military Handbook" Reliability Prediction of 
Electronic Equipment" published by the u.s Department of 
Defense has equations for predicting the reliability of 
most types of electronic components. The equation for 
predicting the failure rate for gold plated board to board 
connectors, at a given temperature, is: 
Connector failure rate= Base failure rate x (Ex P x K) 
Where E represents Environmental conditions 
P represents the number of Pins in the connector 
K represents number of connector Mating cycles 
Assuming a ground based benign environment (E = 3.4) with 
expected connector mating cycles limited to once per 2,000 
hours, a 96 pin connector (such as a VME connector) would 
have a failure rate of once per eighteen million hours 
(assuming a base failure rate of 0.00047). This is about 
six times more reliable than an integrated circuit. 
With the same environmental conditions, a 24 pin socket 
for an integrated circuit would have an expected failure 
rate of once per 87 million hours. This is twenty five 
times better than the integrated circuit that will be 
plugged into the socket. 
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Good quality interconnections, like passive 
components such as resistors and ceramic capacitors, do 
not figure prominently in the expected system reliability. 
The MIL-HDBK-217D gives the following equation for 
predicting the reliability of an integrated circuit: 
Failure rate= Q x [Cl X T X V + ((C2+C3) X E)] X L 
Where Q represents Device Quality factor 
T represents Device temperature acceleration factor 
V represents device voltage derating factor 
E represents the application environment factor 
L represents the device learning curve factor 
Cl, C2 represent the device complexity factors 
C3 represents the package complexity factor 
The quality factor describes the benefits of 
different levels of component screening such as Class S 
of MIL-M-38510 which is used for many space applications, 
or Class B of MIL-STD-883 which is used for many military 
appllcations. Class s level quality factor is rated 
at 0.5. Class B, B-0, B-1, B-2 quality levels have 
quality factors of 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, and 6.5 respectively. 
Industrial quality components that have been burned in for 
160 hours at 125 degrees C have a quality factor of 17.5 
and is considered to be at a quality level of D. The 
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typical commercial product with no screening is called 
level D-1 and has a quality factor of 35.0. The 
difference in screening levels can affect the calculated 
system reliability by seventy fold! 
The learning factor is either 1.0 or 10.0 depending 
if the device process is mature or experimental. The 
application factor describes if the system is ground-
based, fixed, mobile, or airborne. This factor considers 
vibration, temperature cycling, and thermal shock. Except 
for extreme environments, this factor typically ranges 
from 2.5 to 6.0. The voltage factor for logic devices is 
1. 0. 
The component complexity factors can be calculated 
from the number of gates, NG, in the IC as 
For Bipolar SSI: Cl - 7.48 X (10 E-4) X (NG 1\0.654), 
C2 - 2.19 X (10 E-4) X (NG 1\0.364). 
For CMOS SSI: Cl - 2.17 X (10 E-3 X (NG 1\0.357), 
C2 - 3.11 X (10 E-4) X (NG 1\0.178). 
For MOS LSI: Cl - 1.75 X (10 E-3) X (NG "'0.4), 
C2 - 2.52 X (10 E-4) X (NG "'0.226). 
For a typical 50 gate bipolar SSI device, Cl would be 
0.0097 and C2 would be 0.0009. A five thousand gate LSI 
device will have Cl= 0.053 and C2 = 0.0017. The 
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complexity of the integrated circuit does not have a 
strong affect on the device reliability. 
The package complexity factor C3 is described by the 
following equations: 
Hermetic DIPs: C3 - 9.0 x (10 E-5) x (NP A 1.51) 
Nonhermetic Dips: C3 - 2.0 x (10 E-4) x (NP A 1.23) 
Where NP is the number of pins. 
For 24 pin devices, both hermetic and nonhermetic packages 
have the same value for CJ, 0.010. The package type and 
size are minor factors in device reliability. 
The temperature factor is described by the following 
equation: T = 0.1 exp [-A ((1/(Tj+273)) - (1/298))], 
where Tj - Junction temperature, 
A - 5000 to 6300 for Bipolar, and 
A - 7500 to 10,500 for CMOS 
The calculated temperature factor for some different 
technologies and temperatures are shown in Table TAl. 
The temperature of the device has a strong affect on 
the expected device reliability. For bipolar devices, the 
failure rate doubles and for CMOS, triples for every ten 
degree Crise in junction temperature. 
An integrated circuit screened to 883B levels and 
used in a typical industrial control environment has the 
following calculated reliability: 
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Failure rate - 6.5x[(l.6x.Olxl.0)+(.001 +.Ol)x2.5]xl 
Failure rate - 0.283 failures per million hours. 
This calculated failure rate is very close to the observed 
failure rates for res as observed by RAC. 
The only parameters for device reliability that the 
system designer has some control of are device screening 
and the ambient temperature at which the res operate. 
Table TAl. Temperature factor as a function of temperature 
and technology 
Temperature LSTTL NMOS CMOS 
-----------
-----
----
----
25 C. 0.1 0.1 0.1 
35 C. 0.2 0.28 0.31 
45 C. 0.38 0.71 0.90 
55 C. 0.71 1.7 2.5 
65 C. 1.3 4.0 6.3 
75 C. 2.2 8.7 15.0 
_________________
_________________
___ ._.. _____________
______ _ 
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APPENDIX B 
COST OF INTEGRATED CIRCUIT SCREENING PROGRAMS 
Many IC manufacturers and independent test houses 
offer burn in and test programs for integrated circuits. 
The vendors offer a variety of different screening levels 
depending on the cost/reliability constraints of the 
customer. Most test houses offer a low cost burn-in 
program that roughly approximates the military class D 
screening level. Some test houses offer more expensive 
screening that approximates military 883B level quality. 
The actual burn in and test programs vary from vendor to 
vendor because of cost or capabilities. Table AB1 lists 
the pricing details of some common res with different 
. levels of screening. 
The T.I. "3", the Fairchild "QR", the National "B+" 
and "A+", and the RCA "X" screening programs approximate 
a military "D" quality level which is about twice as good 
as an untested commercial grade part. The RCA "F3" I 
the National "/883", and the T.I."54 series" screening are 
"B" quality level programs that have quality levels thirty 
five times better than the unscreened product. The level 
"D" screening adds, on an average, eleven cents to the 
base price of each component. The "B" level screening 
programs increase the cost, on the listed components, by 
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Table AB1. Effect of reliability screening IC price. 
Texas Instruments 
SN74LSOON 
SN74LSOON3 
SN54LS00J 
SN74LS240N 
SN74LS240N3 
SN54LS240J 
SN74LS373N 
SN74LS373N3 
SN54LS373J 
FAIRCHILD 
74ACOOPC 
74ACOOPCQR 
74F541PC 
74F541PCQR 
NATIONAL SEMICONDUCTOR 
CD4001BCN 
CD4001BCN/B+ 
CD4001BCN/A+ 
CD4001BMJ/883 
$0.25 SN74LS138N 
$0.38 SN74LS138N3 
$0.83 SN54LS138J 
$0.52 SN74LS299N 
$0.72 SN74LS299N3 
$2.72 SN54LS299J 
$0.52 
$0.72 
$3.44 
$0.32 74Fl09PC 
$0.42 74Fl09PCQR 
$2.14 74F574PC 
$2.28 74F574PCQR 
$0.33 
$0.37 
$0.45 
$1.50 
CD4031BCN 
CD4031BCN/B+ 
CD4031BCN/A+ 
CD4031BMJ/883 
RCA SOLID STATE PRODUCTS 
CD74HCTOOE 
CD74HCTOOEX 
CD54HCTOOF 
CD54HCTOOF3 
CD54HCTOOF3A 
CD74HCT373E 
CD74HCT373EX 
CD54HCT373F 
CD54HCT373F3 
CD54HCT373F3A 
$0.33 
$0.53 
$0.64 
$1.74 
$1.71 
$1.16 
$1.35 
$2.48 
$7.25 
$7.18 
CD74HCT245E 
CD74HCT245EX 
CD54HCT245F 
CD54HCT245F3A 
$0.38 
$0.52 
$1.36 
$1.34 
$1.54 
$4.45 
$0.40 
$0.50 
$2.78 
$2.93 
$2.77 
$2.81 
$2.89 
$9.30 
$1.22 
$1.42 
$3.18 
$9.57 
-------~====~~~-------------------------------------------
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three hundred and twenty-four percent! If the reliability 
of the quality levels quoted in MIL-HDBK-217D are to be 
believed, then the large additional cost of "B" level 
screening buys a very large increase in reliability. 
Unfortunately, most commercial applications for real time 
computers can not absorb a tripling in system component 
costs. 
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APPENDIX C 
SAMPLE REAL TIME CONTROL SYSTEMS 
This appendix lists the chip count, board area, 
the number of connectors, and the cost for the printed 
circuit boards of some realtime industrial control systems 
produced by Bridgeport-Textron and North American Drager, 
as well as PCBs produced by other firms. This list will 
provide valuable costing information. The costs indicated 
represent the cost to manufacture or buy at OEM discounts. 
A brief description of each system will be provided as 
insight into the actual implementation of a real time 
control system. 
The first system to be analyzed is the Narkomed 3 
(NM3), an anesthesia monitoring system implemented with 
eleven Z80 microprocessors. The NMJ has two CRT displays, 
six patient monitors for such measurments as breathing 
pressure, volume, gas analysis, blood pressure, and blood 
oxygen saturation, an internal communications controller, 
and an external communications controller. The NM3 has a 
microprocessor allocated for each function and they 
communicate over several eight bit communication buses. 
The NM3 is a distributed Peer processing system. It is 
similar to the communications bus design example described 
in this thesis and its cost is detailed in Table ACl . 
. 't 
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Table ACl. Cost analysis of NM3 system based on 11 Z80 
. 
microprocessors 
BOARD 
Monitor CPU 
Monitor Interface 
Display 
SIZE (si) 
49.5 
25.0 
10.5 
CHIP-COUNT 
-----------
28 
8 
2 
CONNECTORS COST 
----------
----
5 $115 
3 $105 
2 $ 60 
-----------------------
-----------------------
------------
Each Monitor 85.0 
Total Monitors (6) 510.0 
CRT Controller 
Total CRTs (3) 
49.5 
148.5 
Internal Communications 
Controller 72.3 
External Communications 
Controller 66.0 
Interfaces 
Backplanes (2) 
45.75 
45.0 
38 
228 
35 
105 
43 
43 
25 
0 
10 
60 
5 
15 
16 
10 
13 
10 
$280 
$1,680 
$150 
$450 
$269 
$437 
$292 
$60 
---------------------
---------------------
-----------------
Total 887.55 444 124 $3,188 
Cost/Chip - $7.18 -
S.I./Chip - 1.99 
% Display I/0 - 26% -
% Machine I/0 - 16% 
~ 0 Total I/0 - 42% of Total #IC 
NOTE: This information was obtained from internal N.A.D. 
documents and was used with N.A.D. approval. 
------------------------
------------------------
----------
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Analysis of the R2E4, a four axis real time control 
system for milling machines produced by Bridgeport-Textron 
is provided in Table AC2. The R2E4 is implemented with 
two MC68000 microprocessors that are built into a Versabus 
backplane but they communicate with each other over a 
serial communications channel. Each MC68000 processor 
also communicates with single chip microcontrollers over 
serial links. The system features a CRT display for the 
--------~---------------------------------
-----------------
Table AC2. Cost analysis of the R2E4 system with two 68000 
. 
microprocessors 
BOARD 
CPU - user 
CRT controller 
User Interface 
CPU - motors 
SIZE (si) 
130.5 
130.5 
78.0 
130.5 
Machine interface 128.0 
Backplane 
Power Up control 
52.0 
32.0 
CHIP-COUNT CONNECTORS COST 
129 2 $1,200 
108 2 $700 
15 4 $200 
72 15 $1,000 
18 
0 
3 
12 
10 
5 
$300 
$400 
$100 
------------------
------------------
------------------
----
Total 681.5 345 50 
Cost/IC - $11.30 -
S.I./IC - 1.97 
% Display I/0 - 32% 
~ 0 Machine I/0 - 24% 
% Total I/0 - 56% of Total #IC 
NOTE: This information was obtained from internal 
Bridgeport-Textron documents and was used with 
Bridgeport approval. 
$3,900 
---~-------------------------------~~~===~~~--------------
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operator and closed loop DC servo motor control of the 
machine's axes of motion. One MC68000 controls the axis 
drives while the other handles the operator interface. 
One could also use the VME bus boards directly 
available from an OEM manufacturers to build real time 
industrial control systems. Pricing structure of such 
boards is indicated in table AC3. 
------------------------
----------------------.-.-----------
Table AC3. Cost data for the OEM boards. 
BOARD SIZE (si) 
VME CPU 57.5 
(Plessey #68-25) 
VME ROM Memory 57.5 
(DY-4 #DVME-505) 
VME CRT Controller 57.5 
(Eltec #OPAC) 
VM£ Serial I/0 57.5 
(Plessey #PMESI0-3) 
VME Analog I/0 57.5 
(Xycom XVME-540) 
VME Backplane 50.0 
Total 337.5 
Cost/IC 
S.I./IC 
% Display 
% Machine 
% Total 
CHIP-COUNT CONNECTORS 
-
-
-
I/0 -
I/0 -
I/0 -
110 
84 
69 
78 
60 
0 
401 
$17.52 
0.84 
17% 
34% 
67% of Total 
2 
2 
7 
3 
4 
12 
30 
#IC 
COST 
$1,481 
$928 
$2,170 
$840 
$1,260 
$350 
$7,029 
Note: The VME board prices include a typical discount of 
30% available to high volume users. 
_________________
_________________
_______________ ._ ____
___ _ 
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The combined average cost and size statistics for 
the NM3, R2E4, and the OEM VME systems are: 
Cost/IC - $11.86 
S.I./IC - 1.60 
% Display I/0 - 26% 
% Machine I/0 - 16% 
% Total I/0 - 42% of Total #IC 
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APPENDIX D 
MICROPROCESSOR PERFORMANCE COMPARISONS 
Determining the relative computing power of 
microprocessors that span different architectures and 
generations and are made by different manufacturers is an 
inexact science. While it is possible to contruct bench-
mark programs for specific applications, any general 
statements are hard to make because of the varied 
applications in which microprocessors are used. However, 
an attempt must be made to provide a means to judge the 
relative cost of different system architectures. 
Table AD1 was made with a few assumptions. The 
processors are placed in the chart according to the 
typical parts used in typical systems. 
. After a part is 
released for production by a manufacturer, newer, faster 
parts will be produced in the following years. Sometimes 
specially selected high speed parts are available from the 
manufacturer, these only blur the line between succeeding 
generations of processors and so do not appear on this 
performance comparison. The comparison assumes assembly 
language or "C'' programming because many high level 
language compilers can have huge disparities in the 
execution speed of their generated output code. This 
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chart was constructed with data from a variety of sources 
(20 - 33 ]. Differences of ten to one for execution speed 
are common for a set of compilers for a given language 
(such as "C") for a given processor (such as the 68000). 
The system configurations and resources available to a 
processor can help or hinder its performance relative to 
its competitors. 
----------------------------------------------------------
Table AD1. Comparison of various processors 
Performance 
-----------
1.0 
3.0 
3.5 
4.5 
6.0 
9.0 
10.0 
11.0 
22.0 
30.0 
35.0 
70.0 estimated 
Processor Type 
--------------
6800, 6502 (1 mhz), 8085 (2 mhz) 
6809 (2 mhz), Z80 (4 mhz) 
8088 (5 mhz) 
Z8000 (4 mhz) 
8086 (8 mhz) 
32032 (10 mhz) 
68000, 80286 (10 mhz) 
Z8000, 68010 (10 mhz) 
Vax 11/780 
80386 (16 mhz) 
68020 (16 mhz) 
80486,68030 (30 mhz) 
-----------------------------------------------------------
Table ADl assumes a typical workload that involves 
mostly nonarithmetic operations. 
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If a large arithmetic work load is expected, the results 
of the chart must be shifted in favor of the 32 bit micro-
processors. Using the softwarQ library for the Z80 that 
was produced by Pro-Log Corporation, a 4 mhz Z80 will 
perform as follows: 
Divide (32 bit by 16 bit) 
Multiply (32 bit by 32 bit) 
Divide (32 bit by 32 bit) 
410 microseconds 
- 4,772 microseconds 
- 3,931 microseconds 
The 68000 (10 mhz) will perform the 32 bit by 16 bit 
divide in 12.2 microseconds which is 33 times faster than 
the Z80. The 68020 (16 mhz) will perform the 32 bit 
multiply in 2.75 microseconds which is 1,735 times faster 
than the Z80! The 68020 will perform the 32 bit divide in 
5.625 microseconds which is 698 times faster than the Z80. 
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APPENDIX E 
MODEL SYSTEMS' DESIGN DETAILS 
The representative systems for the Standard Bus, the 
Complex Bus, the Communication Bus, and the Octopus System 
are designed with the same generation of integrated 
circuits. The memory chips are 256K bits in size. The 
read/write (RAM) memory chips are organized as 32k bytes 
by 8 bits and are static, not requiring logic to perform 
refresh operations. The processors' program memory is 
based on EPROM technology and is also organized as 32Kx8. 
The use of byte wide memories allows the designer to 
interchange EPROM with pin compatible RAM. 
The video refresh memory is made up of 64K x 4 
dynamic RAMs with specialized logic to aid the design of 
video systems. These specialized memories are called 
video RAMs (VRAMs). Most modern video controllers are 
designed to interface with these new devices. VRAMs 
incorporate shift registers used to shift out video 
information while allowing the processor to access the 
memory array in a random access manner. The VRAMs are 
considered dual port memories. 
The majority of the control logic used in these 
systems is designed with PLDs (programmable logic devices) 
to reduce total chip counts. The use of PLDs also helps 
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to preserve design freedom by allowing modifications to be 
made to the hardware design late in the design phase of 
the project. It is assumed in this thesis that all bus 
interface chips are eight bits per package. 
Standard Bus Example 
The design for the standard bus system is 
based on the Versabus architecture that was promoted by 
Motorola Inc .. The Versabus was the forerunner of the 
VME bus that is promoted by Signetics, Motorola, and 
others. The versabus board size is large (120 square 
inches) which is an aid in reducing the number of boards 
needed to build a system. 
The system is divided into two boards, a processor 
board, and an I/0 board. The two boards are connected 
with a 32 bit address bus, a 32 bit data bus, and 57 
control signals, most of which are not used in the model 
under discussion. The chip count in the design situation 
being analysed here is only 152 integrated circuits. The 
serial interfaces are implemented on the processor board 
to balance the component counts between the two boards. 
The serial interfaces on the processor board also aid the 
development and testing of the processor board by allowing 
processor board to function as a stand alone entity and 
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still communicate with other test equipment. 
The standard bus system devotes forty percent of the 
system to input and output functions. The interface 
between the two boards costs more than twenty-two percent 
of the system's resources. The component list for the 
standard bus system under discussion is provided in tables 
AEl and AE2. 
------------------------------------------------------------
Table AEl. PARTS for STANDARD BUS 
Processor Board 
1. (1) MC68020 - 32 bit Microprocessor 
2. (1) 25 mhz crystal oscillator - processor clock 
3. (16) 27C256 - 32K x 8 Eprom, program storage 
4. (16) TC55257P - 32k x 8 static RAM, data storage 
5. (5) GAL20V8 - PLO - Control signal, memory decode 
6. (4) GAL20V8 - PLO - Memory control logic 
7. (1) GAL20V8 - PLO - Bus time out logic 
8. (1) 68901 - Interrupt controller, system timers 
9. (2) GAL20V8 - PLO - Interrupt control 
10. (1) RTC62421 - Real time clock 
11. (1) 16 rnhz crystal oscillator for system timing needs 
12. (1) 74Fl91 - counter to provide lower rate clocks 
13. (1) DS1232 - Power up reset generator 
14. (1) 74ALS541 Data bus buffer for RTC,68901, CLD-180 
15. (1) CL-CD180 - Octal Uart for serial communications 
16. (1) 9.8304 Mhz crystal oscillator for baudrate clocks 
17. (2) 26LS31 - RS-422 drivers for serial ports 
18. (2) 26LS33 - RS-422 receivers for serial ports 
19. (3) GAL20V8 - PLD - Bus buffer control 
20. (4) 74F545 - 8 bit Bidirectional Transceiver, data bus 
21. (4) 74F545 - 8 bit Transceiverr, address bus 
22. (2) 74F541 - 8 bit Buffer, basic bus control signals 
23. (1) 74F541 - 8 bit Buffer, DMA control signals 
24. (2) 74F541 - 8 bit Buffer, Interupt control signals 
~-------------------
76 ICs 
----------------------------------------------------------
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Table AE2. Parts for Standard Bus Input/Output Board 
1. (1) 95C60 - QPDM - Video Controller 
2. (16) uPD41264 - 64K x 4 Video RAM 
3. (4) 74F676 - 16 bit high speed video shift registers 
4. (1) 57.83Mhz crystal oscillator for 800x600 video 
5. (1) 74AS2645 - 10 bit buffer, video RAM address 
6. (3) GAL16V8 - PLD, video logic and buffers 
7. (5) 74ALS541 - 8 bit buffer for digital inputs, bus 
8. (8) MCT6 - Dual optocouplers to isolate digital inputs 
9. (5) 74ALS574 - 8 bit register for digital outputs 
10. (2) ULN2823 - 8 bit high power output buffers 
11. (1) ADC1005 - 10 bit ADC, system test, analog inputs 
12. (2) 74HCT4067 - 16 input Analog multiplexer 
13. (5) LT1014 - Quad Op Amps for analog 
14. (1) X2001 - 128 x 8, NOVRAM, for calibration data 
15. (1) SAA1099 - Sound generator for audio alarms 
16. (1) LM386 - audio amplifier 
17. (7) GAL20V8 - PLO, address and control decode 
18. (4) 74F545 - 8 bit Bidirectional Transceiver, data bus 
19. (4) 74F545 - 8 bit transceiver, address bus 
20. (2) 74F541 - 8 bit Buffer, basic bus control signals 
21. (1) 74F541 - 8 bit Buffer, OMA control signals 
22. (2) 74F541 - 8 bit Buffer, Interupt control signals 
76 ICs 
The MC68020 microprocessor is a 32 bit machine with 
a perfomance of approximately 3.5 million instructions per 
second (MIPS) when operated at 25 Mhz. The large number 
of PLDs used for the control and decode logic is required 
by the necessity to operate at high speed with fewer 
levels of logic. 
The 68901 is an integrated peripheral IC thqt 
includes four timers that can be used to provide system 
clocks used by the software. The 68901 also provides 
interrupt control logic. The RTC62421 is a time of day 
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clock that also keeps track of days, months, and years. 
~ 
. It is powered by a battery or super capacitor (1 Farad) 
to provide non volatile time keeping for the system. The 
TOD clock is important for real time control systems that 
keep track of system run time for warrenty needs. 
The CL-CD180 is a VLSI device that has eight 
independent UARTS. Each UART has its own baud rate 
generator and hardware hand-shaking control signals (if 
needed). The chosen hardware interface for the serial 
ports is RS-422 because of its superior noise immunity as 
compared to RS-232. 
The 74F54ls and 74F545s are eight bit buffers used 
to provide the signal drive levels needed for reliable 
communication between the system's boards over the 
backplane PCB. 
The Input/Output board is divided into three 
sections, the video controller, the general I/0, and the 
bus interface. The video logic is implemented with a 
AMD 95C60 video coprocessor and the video RAMs. 
The general I/0 has a mixture of parallel digital 
I/0 that has optically isolated inputs for increased noise 
immunity, and buffered outputs capable of driving 
industrial loads such as solenoids and relays. 
The X2001 is a nonvolatile memory made up of RAM and 
EEPROM that shadow each other. On powerup, data is copied 
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from EEPROM to RAM automatically. The contents of RAM can 
be copied into EEPROM with a single command signal. The 
NOVRAM is used to store calibration data, user and system 
configuration information. 
Complex Bus Example 
The design example for the Complex Bus System is 
based on the extended VME bus specification that includes 
the VMX bus as a local or private bus used to access 
private resources. The VME bus features a 32 bit data 
bus, a 32 bit address bus, and 43 control signals to 
access global resources. The VMX bus features a 32 bit 
data bus, a 24 bit address bus that is multiplexed onto 
12 lines, and 8 control signals. 
The design example for the complex bus being 
discussed here is divided into five boards. There are two 
identical processor boards that may or may not execute the 
same software. There are two I/0 boards, one for each 
processor, that communicate with their processor over 
their private VMX buses. These boards are described as 
being identical but they may have different configurations 
of I/0 hardware as needed by the application. Table AE3, 
AE4, and AES give the detailed component lists for this 
architecture. 
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Table AE3. Parts for Complex Bus Processor Board 
(one of two) 
1. (1) MC68020 - 32 bit Microprocessor 
2. (1) 12.5 mhz crystal oscillator - processor clock 
3. (12) 27C256 - 32K x 8 Eprom, program storage 
4. (12) TC55257P - 32k x 8 static RAM, data storage 
5. (1) 68901 - Interrupt controller, system timers 
6. (5) GAL20V8 - PLO - Control signal, memory decode 
7. (2) GAL20V8 - PLO - Memory control logic 
8. (2) GAL20V8 - PLO - Interrupt control 
9. (1) GAL20V8 - PLO - Bus time out logic 
10. (1) 16 mhz crystal oscillator for system timing needs 
11. (1) 74Fl91 - counter to provide lower rate clocks 
12. (1) OS1232 - Power up reset generator 
13. (1) RTC62421 - Real time clock 
VMX (private bus interface) 
14. (1) GAL20V8 - PLO - Bus buffer control 
15. (4) 74F545 - 8 bit Transceiver, 32 bit data bus 
16. (4) 74F541 - 8 bit Buffer, multiplexed address bus 
17. (2) 74F541 - 8 bit Buffer, basic bus control signals 
VME global bus interface 
18. (2) GAL20V8 - PLD - Bus buffer control 
19. (4) 74F545 - 8 bit Transceiver, 32 bit data bus 
20. (4) 74F545 - 8 bit transceiver, 32 bit address bus 
21. (2) 74F541 - 8 bit Buffer, basic bus control signals 
22. (2) 74F541 - 8 bit Buffer, OMA control signals 
23. (2) 74F541 - 8 bit Buffer, Interrupt control signals 
68 res 
-----------~-------~------------------------~-------------
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Table AE4. Parts for the Complex Bus CRT Board 
1. (6) GAL20V8 - PLD, address and control decode 
2. (4) GAL20V8 - PLO, processor contention control 
3. (2) CY7C412 - FIFO, processor contention control 
4. (1) DS1232 - Dead processor time out 
5. (1) GAL16V8 - PLO, dead processor timeout logic 
6. (1) 95C60 - QPDM - Video Controller 
7. (16) uPD41264 - 64K x 4 Video RAM 
8. (4) 74F676 - 16 bit high speed video shift registers 
9. (1) 57.83Mhz crystal oscillator for 800x600 video 
10. (1) 74AS2645 - 10 bit buffer, video RAM address 
11. (5) GAL16V8 - PLO, video logic and buffers 
12. (4) 27C256-12 - 32Kx8 Eprom, Common CRT Displays 
13. (4) TC55257P - 32k x 8 RAM, shared data storage 
14. (4) 74F545 - 8 bit Bidirectional Transceiver, data bus 
15. (4) 74F545 - 8 bit transceiver, address bus 
16. (2) 74F541 - 8 bit Buffer, basic bus control signals 
17. (2) 74F541 - 8 bit Buffer, OMA control signals 
18. (2) 74F541 - 8 bit Buffer, Interupt control signals 
64 res 
Table AE5. Parts for the Complex Bus I/0 BOARD 
1. 
2. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
( 2 ) 
( 4) 
( 3 ) 
( 2) 
( 1) 
( 1) 
( 3 ) 
( 1) 
( 1) 
( 2 ) 
( 1) 
( 1) 
( 1) 
( 1) 
( 7) 
( 4) 
( 4) 
( 1) 
74ALS541 - 8 bit buffer for digital inputs 
MCT6 - Dual optocoupler, to isolate digital inputs 
74ALS574 - 8 bit register for digital outputs 
ULN2823 - 8 bit high power output buffers 
ADC1005 - 10 bit Analog to digital converter 
74HCT4067 - 16 input Analog multiplexer 
LT1014 - Quad Op Amps for analog inputs 
SAA1099 - Sound generator for audio alarms 
LM386 - audio amplifier for audio alarms 
68681 - Dual Uarts for serial communications 
3.6864 Mhz crystal oscillator for baudrate clocks 
26LS31 - RS-422 drivers for serial ports 
26LS33 - RS-422 receivers for serial ports 
X2001 - 128 x 8 NOVRAM, for calibration data 
GAL20V8 - PLO, address and control decode 
74F545 - 8 bit Bidirectional Transceiver, data bus 
74F541 - 8 bit Buffer, address bus 
74F541 - 8 bit Buffer, bus control signals 
39 !Cs 
----------------
----------------
----------------
----------
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The processors share a common video board that also 
provides some common program (Eprom) and data (Ram) 
memory. The RAM memory serves as a means of communication 
between the two processors. The EPROM allows either 
processor to provide video displays without paying for the 
memory twice. Because the resources on the video board 
are shared between two processors, there is a requirement 
to provide a means to resolve conflicts if the processors 
desire to access a resource at the same time. The QPDM 
video controller is actually a video co-processor that 
perform complex tasks such as "fill bounded region". The 
QPDM requires a block of data to perform an operation, it 
would get confused if two processors wrote data or 
commands to it at the same time. 
The design example for the complex bus has a 
component count of 270 integrated circuits. The I/0 
circuitry represents 39% of the system total. The bus 
interface circuitry consumes 33% of the total system. 
The processor board for the complex system is very 
similar to the processor board of the standard bus. 
To make room for the VMX bus interface, the serial 
interfaces are moved off the processor card. This lack of 
serial ports on the processor card makes the complex bus 
cpu board more difficult to design and test because now 
one needs to have an operational backplane and an I/0 card 
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to communicate with the processor board. 
Some cards of the complex bus are simple. For 
example, the CRT board features only a VME interface and 
the I/0 boards only have VMX bus interfaces. 
To reduce the component cost, the UARTs are 
implemented with 68681 dual UARTs. There is sufficent 
PCB real estate to absorb the larger component count on 
the I/0 card. 
Communications Bus Example 
The design of the communications bus architecture 
is based on a patient monitoring system designed and built 
by North American Drager. The system is composed of four 
sections, the I/0 modules, the display controllers, the 
internal communications controller (ICC) and the external 
communications controller (ECC). 
The I/0 modules are self contained units that can 
monitor and/or control subsections of the system. The I/0 
modules communicate with the ICC over an eight bit data 
bus that is controlled with only eight control signals. 
The I/0 modules are periodically polled by the internal 
communications controller for data and status, and 
operation are i~~nP<i hv the --- -- . ..& 
central bus controller as needed. The I/0 modules are 
indentical to each other but the actual I/0 circuitry 
88 
depends on the application. The I/0 modules are equipped 
with serial interfaces if there are internal sensors or 
modules that communicate with serial links. Detailed 
parts lists for the design under consideration are 
presented in tables AE6 - AE9. 
-----------------
-----------------
-----------------
----------
Table AE6. Parts for Communication Bus 
1 . ( 1 ) 
2 . ( 1 ) 
3 . ( 1 ) 
4. ( 1) 
5. ( 1) 
6. ( 5) 
7. ( 1) 
8. ( 1) 
9. ( 1) 
10. (1) 
11. (1) 
12. (1) 
13. (2) 
14. (1) 
15. (1) 
16. (2) 
17. (1) 
18. (1) 
19. (2) 
20. ( 2) 
Internal Communication Controller 
Z80A - 8 bit microprocessor 
4 mhz crystal oscillator 
27C256 - 32K x 8 Eprom - program storage 
TC55257P - 32k x 8 static RAM, data storage 
X2001 - 128 x 8 NOVRAM, calibration data 
GAL20V8 - PLO, Address decoding, bus(s) control 
Z8430A - General purpose counter/timer 
SAA1099 - Sound generator for audio alarms 
LM386.- audio amplifier 
RTC62421 - Real time clock 
DS1232 - Power up reset/ watchdog timer 
Interface to I/0 Processors 
CY7C412 - FIFO, processor command buffer 
75ALS160 - 8 bit transceiver, data and control 
74ALS990 - 8 bit latch, bus interface 
74ALS244 - 8 bit buffer, bus interface 
Interface to CRT Processor 
74ALS245 - 8 bit transceiver, data and control 
74ALS244 - 8 bit buffer, status from CRTs 
Interface to Serial Interface Processor 
- Dual port mem, interface to serial I/F 
74ALS245 - 8 bit transceiver, data and control 
74ALS244 - 8 bit bfr, Address bus, dual port mem 
---------.----
2s res 
------------.-----~--------------------
-----------._ __________ _ 
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Table AE7. Parts for the CRT Controller (one of two) 
1. (1) Z80A - 8 bit microprocessor 
2. (1) Z8430A - General purpose counter/timer 
3. (1) 27C256 - 32K x 8 Eprom - program storage 
4. (1) TC55257P - 32k x 8 static RAM, data storage 
5. (1) 4 mhz crystal oscillator 
6. (2) GAL20V8 - PLD, Address/control decoding 
•, 
7. (1) TMS34061 - Video timing and memory controller 
8. (2) uPD41264 - Video RAM 
9. (1) GAL16V8 - PLD, video timing logic 
10. (1) GAL20V8 - PLD, video control logic 
11. (1) 74Fl99 - Video shift register 
12. (1) 57.3 mhz crystal oscillator, video timing 
13. (1) CY7C412 - FIFO, processor command buffer 
14. (2) 75ALS160 - 8 bit transceiver, data and control 
15. (1) 74ALS990 - 8 bit latch, bus interface 
16. (1) DS1232 - Power up reset/ watchdog timer 
19 res 
Table AES. Parts for the Input/Output Module (one of six) 
1. (1) ZBOA - 8 bit microprocessor 
2. (1) Z8430A - General purpose counter/timer 
3. (1) 27C256 - 32K x 8 Eprom - program storage 
4. (1) TC55257P - 32k x 8 static RAM, data storage 
5. (1) 4 mhz crystal oscillator 
6. (2) GAL20V8 - PLO, Address/control decoding 
7. (1) GAL16V8 - PLD, Bus interface control 
7. (2) 75ALS160 - 8 bit transceiver, data and control 
8. (2) 74ALS990 - 8 bit latch, bus interface 
9. (1) 74ALS244 - 8 bit buffer, bus interface 
10. (2) 74ALS244 - 8 bit buffer, digital inputs 
11. (4) MCT6 - Dual optocoupler, to isolate digital inputs 
12. (1) 74ALS990 - 8 bit latch, digital output 
13. (1) ULN2823 - 8 bit high power output buffers 
14. (1) ADC1005 - 10 bit Analog to digital converter 
15. (1) 74HC4051 - 8 input analog multiplexer 
16. (2) LT1014 - Quad Op Amps for analog 
l- ~ ; .1.4 ,, ""u~.1. .. ?"""..>? - PO"·-:~-.l. ··- --C"<o+- / t.r~t-f'"'hrina t __ iJn_ er I. , OJ ~ ~ w- up ~-1,.;J>--, ··- -------- .J _. 
26 res 
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Table AE9. Parts for External Serial Communications 
Controller 
1. (1) Z80A - 8 bit microprocessor 
2. (1) Z8430A - General purpose counter/timer 
3. (1) 27C256 - 32K x 8 Eprom - program storage 
4. (1) TC55257P - 32k x 8 static RAM, data storage 
5. (1) 4 mhz crystal oscillator 
6. (2) GAL20V8 - PLD, Address/control decoding 
7. (2) Z8530 - Dual Uart 
8. (1) 26LS31 - RS-422 Driver 
9. (1) 26LS33 - RS-422 Receiver 
10. (1) GAL16V8 - PLO, dual port memory control 
11. (2) 74ALS245 - 8 bit transceiver, data and control 
12. (2) 74ALS244 - 8 bit bfr, Address bus, dual port mem 
13. (1) DS1232 - Power up reset/ watchdog timer 
17 res 
The internal communications controller is the hub 
of the system. It controls the I/0 bus that links the 
I/0 modules to the system. It controls the display bus 
that links the CRT controllers to the system. It has an 
interface with the external communications controller to 
send and receive data to the outside world. The primary 
purpose of the ICC is to gather data from the I/0 modules 
for display on the CRTs. 
The CRT controllers are connected to the ICC with 
the eight bit display bus. The CRT controllers are 
passive devices that display what is available on the 
display bus; the data flows one way, out to the displays. 
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The ECC is interfaced with the ICC with a dual port 
memory. The data is exchanged in packets of messages. 
The ECC is responsible for translating external protocols 
into a format that is understood by the ICC and vice a 
versa. 
The system modules are implemented with Z80s, they 
are 8 bit microprocessors. To approximate a 32 bit cpu 
requires about eleven zaos. The design example uses 10 
Z80s which will work only if the tasks can be properly 
partitioned. 
The communication bus design example's component 
count of integrated circuits is 222. The I/0 circuitry 
represents 40% of the system. The interface circuitry 
consumes only 28% of the of the total system. 
The communications design example may be "under-
powered" with respect to the other design examples. The 
ICC is the logical module to be responsible for guideing 
the operation of the system. The ICC is specified with an 
eight bit processor to minimize the system component 
count. The ICC is heavily burdened with the task of 
running the system communication channels. The ICC has 
little time leftover to interpret the system behavior . 
. 
Another module, the System Interpreter Module (SIM) is 
generally required for systems that are expected to 
interact with their environment instead of just reporting 
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on the environment. The SIM is also connected to the ICC 
through a shared memory port. 
The functionality of the SIM could be included into 
the ICC if the ICC were implemented with a more powerful 
processor. This would then reduce the stature of the 
other processor modules to "Slaves" as the ICC became the 
de facto "Master" of the system. To maintain the 
distributed peer processing system architecture, each of 
the processing modules may have to be scaled up in size 
and performance. A simple conversion to sixteen bit 
processors would increase the system cost by approximately 
twenty percent due to the doubling of the memory costs 
because of the wider data bus, and the additional width of 
the communication interfaces. 
Octopus System Example 
The main processor board of the Octopus system 
is similar to one in the standard bus design example. 
The primary change was the deletion of the bus interface 
logic and the addition of the video display logic. In 
many systems, the highest bandwidth requirements are 
between the processor and the video memory. By placing 
the video logic on the same board as the processor, the 
other I/0 bandwidth requirements should be low enough to 
be supported by a serial link between the I/0 -device and 
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the processor. If another I/0 task also requires a high 
bandwidth link to the processor, then that device should 
be given its own processor to support that I/0 task in 
such a way that the bandwidth requirements between the two 
processors can be reduced. 
This design features half a dozen I/0 modules based 
on a single chip microcontroller that can communicate with 
the main processor over RS-422 serial links. The 68HC811 
microcontroller contains its own EEPROM, RAM, UART, ADC, 
powerup reset logic, and parallel I/0. The micro-
controller can preprocess the data into a form that is 
more manageable for the main processor. 
The octopus system example has a component count of 
153 integrated circuits as shown in Tables AElO and AEll. 
The I/0 circuitry represents 58 percent of the system 
total. The interface logic is only 8% of the system. 
The peripheral processors do not add significantly 
to the net overall processing power of the system. The 
single chip microcontrollers are about as powerful as the 
first generation microprocessors. They can perform 
preprocessing of data for the main processor but the main 
processor will spend additional resources to support the 
communication routines that are used to communicate with 
the peripheral processors. 
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Table AElO. Parts for Octopus System processor board 
Processor core 
1. (1) MC68020 - 32 bit Microprocessor 
2. (1) 25 mhz crystal oscillator - processor clock 
3. (16) 27C256 - 32K x 8 Eprom - program storage 
4. (16) TC55257P - 32k x 8 static RAM, data storage 
5. (5) GAL20V8 - PLD - Control signal, memory decode 
6. (4) GAL20V8 - PLO - Memory control logic 
7. (2) GAL20V8 - PLO - Interrupt control 
8. (1) 68901 - Interrupt controller, system timers 
9. (1) GAL20V8 - PLD - Bus time out logic 
10. (1) RTC62421 - Real time clock 
11. (1) DS1232 - Power ~preset generator 
Video controller 
12. (1) 95C60 - QPOM - Video Controller 
13. (16) uP041264 - 64K x 4 Video RAM 
14. (4) 74F676 - 16 bit high speed shift registers, video 
15. (1) 57.83Mhz crystal oscillator for 800x600 video 
16. (3) GAL16V8 - PLD, video logic and buffers 
17. (1) 74AS2645 - 10 bit buffer, video RAM address 
Serial interface 
18. (2) CL-C0180 - Octal Uart for serial communications 
19. (2) 9.8304 Mhz crystal oscillator for baudrate clocks 
20. (4_) 26LS31 - RS-422 drivers for serial ports 
21. (4) 26LS33 - RS-422 receivers for serial ports 
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Table AEll. Parts for Peripheral Processor Board 
(one of six) 
1. (1) 68HC811A2 - 8 bit single chip microcontroller 
2. (1) 7.3728 mhz crystal oscillator, processor clock 
3. (1) NMC9346E - serial EEPROM for calibration data 
4. (1) DS8921 - RS422 Driver and Receiver 
5. (1) 74HC4051 - 8 input analog multiplexer 
6. (4) MCT6 - Dual optocoupler, to isolate digital inputs 
7. (1) ULN2823 - 8 bit high power output buffers 
8. (1) LT1014 - Quad Op Amps for analog 
11 res 
----------------
----------------
----------------
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The primary software benefit of the peripheral 
processors for the main processor will be the reduction 
of "Bit Banging I/0". The microcontrollers can make the 
I/0 devices appear to be more standardized and idealized 
for the main processor. This would allow the main system 
software to be programmed by personnel who are not 
educated in hardware design. 
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